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The Prosecution of Josef Altstoetter et
al.: Law, Lawyers and Justice in the
Third Reich
Matthew Lippman*
The vast literature on the Holocaust curiously contains few
discussions of the role of German lawyers, judges and legal
officials.' These largely cursory comments typically minimize the
involvement of jurists in Nazi atrocities.2 However, the fact is that
the German legal profession and judiciary played a prominent role
in the excesses of the Third Reich. For instance, an estimated
32,600 persons were sentenced to death during the twelve years of
Hitler's regime.3
The tendency among German jurists following World War II
was to attribute the excesses of the Nazi legal system to an
exaggerated embrace of legal positivism.4 Lawyers reacted by
turning to natural law. Gustav Radbruch, a leading German
professor of jurisprudence, argued in a 1945 essay that an unjust
law neither merited the status of law nor rated respect or obedi-
* Ph.D. Northwestern; J.D., American; LL.M. Harvard; Professor,
Department of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
1. But see H. W. KOCH, IN THE NAME OF THE VOLK: POLITICAL JUSTICE
IN HITLER'S GERMANY (1989); INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE IN THE COURTS
OF THE THIRD REICH(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
On the role of the National Socialist Party courts, see DONALD M. MCKALE, THE
NAZI PARTY COURTS: HITLER'S MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT IN HIS MOVEMENT,
1921-1945 (1974). This contrasts with the substantial literature on the Nazi
medical establishment. See ROBERT N. PROCTOR, RACIAL HYGIENE MEDICINE
UNDER THE NAZIS (1988).
2. See OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE THE USE OF LEGAL PROCE-
DURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS 300 (1961).
3. See KOCH, supra note 1, at 232. Others place the number of death
sentences at 16,560. Id.
4. See, e.g., Gustav Radbruch, Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy, in III LAW,
JUSTICE AND THE COMMON GOOD: THE GREAT DEBATE AND A SEARCH FOR
MEANING 175, 177-78 (Sidney Hyman ed., 1988).
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ence.5 He went on to argue that legal doctrine must be leavened
by the imperatives of the "law of reason.
' 6
This natural law philosophy was reflected in a 1951 decision of
a West German appellate court which was summarized in the
Harvard Law Review.7 The defendant desired to distance herself
from her husband in order to pursue a sexual liaison.8 She
voluntarily reported to the authorities that her husband, while on
leave from the army, had made derogatory remarks about Hitler.9
Her husband subsequently was convicted of making statements
which were inimical to the welfare of the Reich or which impaired
the military defense. 10 He was sentenced to death, but subsequ-
ently was sent to the frontlines." Following the war, a West
German appellate court convicted the defendant-wife of unlawfully
depriving her husband of liberty under the German Criminal Code
of 1871.12 The Court reasoned that the defendant-wife had
accomplished this through voluntarily invoking a law which was
contrary to the "'sound conscience and sense of justice of all decent
human beings."'13
The commentary to the case cautioned that the decision
introduced a measure of uncertainty into legal obligations.14 West
Germans might reasonably fear that they would be subject to
future prosecution for having obeyed the American Military
Government. 5 On the other hand, the commentary noted that
there was a need to counter the Third Reich's propagation of the
philosophy of Gesetz ist Gesetz ("law is law") and to reintroduce a
moral dimension into German jurisprudence. 16
5. Radbruch argued that these legal principles had been embodied in interna-
tional declarations on human and civil rights. Id. at 177-78.
6. Id.
7. Criminal Law-In General-German Citizen Who Pursuant to Nazi Statute
Informed on Husband for Expressing Anti-Nazi Sentiments Convicted Under
Another German Statute in Effect at Time of Act, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1005, 1006
(1951).
8. Id. at 1006
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Criminal Law-In General-German Citizen Who Pursuant to Nazi Statute
Informed on Husband for Expressing Anti-Nazi Sentiments Convicted Under
Another German Statute in Effect at Time of Act, supra note 7, at 1006.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1006-07.
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Oxford Professor H.L.A. Hart criticized the decision of the
appellate court and argued that it would have been preferable to
adopt a retroactive statute. 17 This would have stood as a frank
admission that the authorities confronted a choice between two
unattractive alternatives-either leaving the "self-interested wife"
unpunished or compromising the precious principle prohibiting
retroactive punishment."8 The latter course would convey that the
provision prohibiting comments critical of the Reich was too
immoral to be obeyed while avoiding the philosophically perplexing
proposition that the ordinance was too iniquitous to be acknow-
ledged as a valid statute. 19
Professor Lon L. Fuller of Harvard also endorsed the passage
of a retroactive statute as a mechanism for distancing the contem-
porary German regime from its Nazi legacy.20 But, at the same
time, Fuller contended that the German legal order had so
drastically departed from the requisites of the judicial process that
it did not merit recognition as a legal system. 2' He explained that
a legal system which relied upon the expansive interpretation of
statutes, retroactive application of the law and reliance on terror in
the streets, did not deserve to be denominated as lawful or merit
obedience.22
What was the ethical and legal obligation of the German jurist
who presided over the case of the "self-interested wife?" The West
German Court acquitted the judge, suggesting that the appellate
court determined that the jurist merely had fulfilled his legal
responsibility while the defendant-wife voluntarily had reported her
husband.23 Was this distinction justified? The judge had elasti-
cally interpreted the applicable legal statutes in order to convict
and sentence the husband to death.24 This required the farfetched
factual finding that the husband's statements had undermined the
confidence of the German people in their leaders or had injured
their will to defend the Reich.25
17. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 620 (1958).
18. Id. at 620.
19. Id.
20. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart,
71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 660 (1958).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Criminal Law-In General-German Citizen Who Pursuant to Nazi Statute
Informed on Husband for Expressing Anti-Nazi Sentiments, supra note 7, at 1006.
24. Id.
25. The applicable legal statutes are quoted in Fuller, supra note 20, at 653-54.
346 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:2
The judge certainly was in a better position than the defen-
dant-wife to appreciate the Nazi's perversion of legal principle. On
the other hand, the judge merely had adhered to the precedential
and interpretative principles of National Socialist jurisprudence and
may have lacked criminal intent. This raises the issue of the moral
and legal obligation of a legal practitioner confronting a rapacious
regime. Do law and morality inhabit separate spheres? Should the
jurist conform to the prevailing legal ideology? Resist? Make an
effort to moderate the excesses of the regime? Refuse to partici-
pate? What penalty would the Nazi regime have meted out to the
judge had he refused to convict the defendant-husband or to
preside over the trial? Does the threat of a severe sanction
constitute a legal defense or mitigate the jurist's guilt? Should we
censure or condemn those who refuse to elevate principle over
patriotism or pragmatism? Is it appropriate to subject jurists to
international prosecution for having obeyed the dictates of
domestic law?26
Initially, the Nazi regime's reorganization of the judiciary, legal
profession and legal code are sketched. The judgment of an
American occupation court in convicting Nazi lawyers and judges
of war crimes and crimes against humanity and the disposition of
individual defendants then are outlined. This provides a foundation
for consideration of the causes underlying lawyers' acceptance of
the perversion of legal principle in the Third Reich. 7
I. Hitler's Legal Cosmology
Adolf Hitler, along with railway engineer Anton Dexler, in
1920, drafted the Party Program of the German Worker's Party,
later renamed the National Socialist Workers' Party (NSDAP).28
Article Nineteen demanded that "Roman law, which serves a
materialistic world order, be replaced by a German common
26. The issues of the nature of law and individual obligation were raised by
Fuller in his famous hypothetical question on the grudge informer. See Lon L.
Fuller, The Problem of the Grudge Informer, in THE MORALITY OF LAW 245 (rev.
ed. 1964). Fuller earlier raised many of the same themes in Lon L. Fuller, The
Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949).
27. For a theoretical discussion of so-called "repressive law," see PHILIPPE
NONET AND PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW 29-52 (1978).
28. The Programme of the German Workers' Party, in I NAZISM 1919-1945 A
HISTORY IN DOCUMENTS AND EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS: THE NAZI PARTY, STATE
AND SOCIETY 1919-1939 para. 19, 14, 15 (J. Noakes & G. Pridham eds., 1983).
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law."29 A number of the other provisions advocated the restructur-
ing of legal relationships so as to insure Aryan supremacy.30 For
instance, the platform pronounced that only individuals of "German
blood" were to be "citizens of the State" and "members of the
nation., 31 Non-German immigration was to be prohibited and
foreign nationals (non-citizens) were to be deported in the event of
economic exigency.32  The Party's ultimate aspiration was to
racially purify the judiciary and other public and private institu-
tions. 33
The platform adopted a vigorous approach to crime, calling for
the prosecution and execution of common criminals, usurers and
war profiteers. 34 The party program also demanded a legal attack
on false political reportage.35 Non-Germans were to be prohibited
from financial ownership or participation in German newspapers.36
Individuals whose artistic creations were deemed corruptive of
national life were to be prosecuted and their work suppressed.37
This inchoate legal program reflected Hitler's vicious vision of
the future which was sketched in his tendentious and wide-ranging
tract, Mein Kampf.38 In this 1923 volume, penned from a prison
cell, Hitler elaborated on the pillars of his philosophy of the
"Folkish State" 39 -Aryan purity and supremacy,4° anti-semi-
tism41 and anti-Marxism, 42 the unification of Germanic peo-
29. Id. This romantic invocation of a legal order which expressed German
blood and soul remained the touchstone of Nazi legal ideology. Ironically, much
of the Roman or Italian law which had been incorporated in Germany from the
fifteenth century onwards was rooted in German folk law. See Karl Loewenstein,
Law in the Third Reich, 45 YALE L.J. 779, 784-85 (1936). Roman law was at-
tacked for having severed the connection between law and race and for having
introduced an individualistic element into Teutonic law. See William J. Dickman,
An Outline of Nazi Civil Law, 15 MIss. L.J. 127, 131 (1943).
30. The Programme of the German Workers' Party, supra note 28, at para. 4,
14.
31. Id.
32. Id. at para. 7-8, 14-15.
33. See KOCH, supra note 1, at 24.
34. The Programme of the German Workers' Party, supra note 28, at para. 18,
15.
35. Id. at para. 23, 15.
36. Id. at para. 23(a)(c), 15-16.
37. Id. at art. 23(c), 16.
38. ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 427 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1971).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 294-300.
41. Id. at 57-58.
42. Id. at 535.
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pies,43 the expansion of living-space to the East' and the concen-
tration of political power in a single gifted and great man."
Hitler made little mention of the law in Mein Kampf. His
most memorable passage portrayed the present political order as
illegitimate-the true criminals were described as residing in
parliament rather than in prison.46 He wrote that "there is no use
in hanging petty thieves in order to let big ones go free ... some
day a German national court must judge and execute some ten
thousand of the organizing and ... responsible criminals of the
November betrayal [Versailles Treaty] and everything that goes
with it."47
The law in the Weimar Republic, in Hitler's view, thus was
supporting a corrupt, corroded and unnatural social order.48 He
wrote that this legal structure did not deserve obedience: "even if
the methods of the ruling power are alleged to be legal a thousand
times over, nonetheless the oppressed people's instinct of self-
preservation remains the loftiest justification of their struggle with
every weapon.,
49
Hitler expressed the same defiant attitude in his 1924 treason
trial for having led the Bavarian Beer Hall Putsch. The future
Fuhrer warned that he might be convicted, but that "'[h]istory,
acting as the goddess of a higher truth and a higher justice, will one
day smilingly tear up this verdict, acquitting us of all guilt and
blame.' 50  He went on to condemn those in power who have
"'led our people into misery and ruin and amid the misfortune of
the fatherland have valued their own ego above the life of the
community.' ''51  The conservative and somewhat cowed judges
sentenced Hitler to confinement for five years and he was paroled
after having served six months.52
43. HITLER, supra note 38, at 398.
44. Id. at 654.
45. Id. at 82.
46. Id. at 545.
47. Id. at 545.
48. HITLER, supra note 38, at 96.
49. Id. at 96.
50. Id. at 686.
51. Id.
52. MULLER, supra note 1, at 16. The Munich Court refused to issue a
mandatory deportation order against Hitler, explaining "'[i]n the case of a man
whose thoughts and feelings are as German as Hitler's, the court is of the opinion
that the intent and purpose of the law have no application."' Id. Hitler also was
received with great solicitude before the Supreme Court, in 1930, when he testified
on behalf of three soldiers accused of attempting to organize a Nazi cell within the
German military. Id. at 20-21.
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Hitler viewed the imperatives of National Socialism as taking
precedence over the laws of human society.5 3 The Folkish State,
in his view, was the natural order of the universe.54 The notions
of equality, equal rights and democracy were antiquated aspira-
tions.55 An individual's status depended upon their racial value
and loyalty to the Reich.56 The lower orders only were valued as
beasts of burden.57 Life was a struggle for supremacy and the law
was a blunt instrument for shaping the societal structure in the
interest of racial superiors.5 8  Hitler, upon assuming power,
immediately moved to establish a legal order based upon the
principles of National Socialism.59
II. The Consolidation of the National Socialist Regime
On January 30, 1933, Hitler's long march to power culminated
in his being sworn as Chancellor.6 ° The National Socialists lacked
a malleable majority and President Paul von Hindenburg was
persuaded to call new parliamentary elections.61
Hitler's campaign was fueled by the arson of the Reichstag on
February 27, 1933.62 The historical evidence indicates that the
building likely was ignited by Nazi activists.63 The authorities,
nevertheless, immediately arrested Martinus van der Lubbe, a
Dutch Communist, and subsequently imprisoned Ernst Torgler,
parliamentary leader of the Communist Party, as well as Bulgarian
Communists Georgi Dimitroff, Blagoi Popov and Vassily Tanev. 4
The day following the fire, Hitler persuaded President von
Hindenburg to suspend various constitutional rights in order to
combat the Communist conspiracy.65 This included freedom of
53. HITLER, supra note 38, at 96-97.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 294-96.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 295.
58. The Programme of the German Workers' Party, supra note 28, at 474.
Hans Frank, the head of the Nazi Lawyers' Association and of the Academy of
German Law, in 1934, pronounced that in the National Socialist State the law was
a means for the maintenance and achievement of the Folkish community. Id.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 60-92.
60. See WILLIAM SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 263
(1950).
61. Id. at 265.
62. Id. at 265-270.
63. Id. at 270.
64. See GEORGI DIMITROV, THE REICHSTAG FIRE TRIAL 16-18 (1969).
65. See Decree, Feb. 28, 1933, by Reich President Von Hindenburg, Cosigned
by Reich Chancellor Hitler and Reich Ministers Frick and Guertner, Suspending
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expression and press, the right of assembly, the privacy of commu-
nications, the warrant requirement and the unrestricted right to
private property.66 A refusal to respect these restrictions was
subject to criminal penalty and various crimes under the penal code
were declared to be punishable by death.67
The National Socialists desired to dispatch the accused
expeditiously to the gallows. 8 The Cabinet reluctantly deferred
to the demands of international public opinion and brought the
defendants to trial before the conservative Fourth Panel of the
Reich Supreme Court.69 The plan was to use the trial to persuade
the public that Germany was under siege from a determined and
demonic international movement which could only be countered by
the Nazi Party.7"
The police investigation relied on the testimony of minor
criminals as well as individuals conscripted from concentration
camps and prisons, many of whom had been subjected to mistreat-
ment." The examining magistrate led the prosecution witnesses
through their testimony while maintaining four of the defendants
in fetters for five of the seven month pre-trial period. In the
end, the magistrate returned an indictment for arson in which he
conceded that he had not been able to determine the precise
fashion in which four of the accused had participated in the alleged
crime.73 Minister Hermann Goring seemed unconcerned with the
denial of due process during the pre-trial hearing, explaining that
if the police and judicial investigations had been influenced, they
had been "influenced in the right direction."74
The prosecution evidence at trial generally strained credulity.
The mentally comatose and incompetent van der Lubbe was
alleged to have climbed the icy facade of the Reichstag and to have
executed 167 separate maneuvers in the space of eleven-to-fourteen
minutes. 75 Another example is that the eyewitness testimony of a
Constitutional Rights and Instituting Other Measures, in III TRIAL OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10 160 (1951) [hereinafter JUSTICE CASE DOCS.]
66. Id. at 161.
67. Id. at 162.
68. DIMITROV, supra note 64, at 10.
69. Id. at 76.
70. Id. at 19-20.
71. Id. at 47-48.
72. Id. at 57.
73. DIM1TROV, supra note 64, at 61.
74. Id. at 42.
75. Id. at 63-68.
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waiter linking van der Lubbe with the other defendants was not
corroborated by his co-workers and faltered in the face of evidence
that the Bulgarians were absent from Berlin at the time.7 6 The
prosecution's presentation was punctuated by the rambunctious and
rambling renditions of Hermann Goring.77 The Reich Minister
denounced the Communist conspiracy to take control of Germany,
pausing to pronounce that Dimitrov was a "Communist crook who
came to Germany to set the Reichstag on fire. In my eyes ... [he
is] nothing but a scoundrel, a crook who belongs to the gallows!"7
Goring admonished the Court that "[w]hatever the verdict ... I
shall know how to deal with the guilty.
79
Van der Lubbe was convicted of high treason and insurrection-
ary arson and was sentenced to death while the other accused were
acquitted.8  The Court, however, refused to exonerate these
defendants, noting that the panel continued to harbor suspicions
concerning their guilt.81 The panel insisted that van der Lubbe's
actions were part of a Communist conspiracy which had been
frustrated by the National Socialist regime.' This conclusion was
based on the casuistry that since the Communist Party rejected
individual terrorism, the burning of the Reichstag "was not an act
of individual terror, but an act of mass terror which was to be the
occasion for a general strike leading to insurrection."83
Hitler termed the verdict "laughable"''  while Nazi Party
newspapers called the outcome a "miscarriage of justice" which
confirmed that the legal system was "outmoded."85  The trial
modestly boosted the National Socialist's vote in the March 5, 1933,
election to forty-four percent, which left the Nazi Party dependent
on the Nationalists to form a parliamentary majority.8 6 This
nevertheless provided Hitler with sufficient support to pass the
Enabling Act, on March 24, 1933, which authorized the government
76. Id. at 144-45.
77. Id. at 189.
78. DIMITROV, supra note 64, at 189.
79. Id. at 242.
80. Id. at 245.
81. Id. at 248-49.
82. Id. at 250.
83. DIMITROV, supra note 64, at 251. The Court exonerated the National
Socialist Party of responsibility, reasoning that since the Nazis were assured of
success in the Mar. 5, 1933, election there was no need to improve the Party's
election prospects through igniting the fire. See MULLER, supra note 1, at 33.
84. MULLER, supra note 1, at 34.
85. Id. at 34.
86. Id. at 33.
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of the Reich to "deviate from the constitution."' 7 This effectively
turned plenary power over to the Hitlerite regime. Hitler also
acted to insure that, in the future, dissident defendants would
receive an unsympathetic hearing; the trial of treason was trans-
ferred, on April 24, 1934, to the newly created People's Court.88
President Hindenburg succumbed to illness and passed away
on August 2, 1934.89 Three hours later, it was announced that
Adolf Hitler would assume both the posts of Chancellor and
President and would henceforth be referred to as Fuhrer and Reich
Chancellor.9 ° The armed forces were immediately required to
swear an oath of loyalty to the Fuhrer rather than to the German
State."
III. The Nazi Judiciary
The German judiciary was the traditional preserve of the
comfortable and conservative upper class.9 2 Judges were commit-
ted to the maintenance of the monarchy and viewed themselves as
soldiers in the struggle against internal subversion.93
The judiciary generally was antagonistic to the Weimar
Republic and issued a series of decisions which exonerated
members of opposition nationalist, right-wing and anti-semitic
movements. 94 Hitler and eight of his supporters were brought to
trial in February 1924 for attempting to overthrow the Bavarian
and federal governments. 95 The Munich court determined that the
defendants' criminal actions had been inspired by the patriotic and
noble aspiration to combat those responsible for Germany's
treasonous surrender in World War 1.96 Hitler, still on probation,
87. The "Enabling Act," in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 163.
88. See SHIRER, supra note 60, at 269. Hitler's derisive attitude was curious
in that the Public Prosecutor, a civil servant under the supervision of the Nazi
regime, had requested the Court to acquit the three Bulgarians. MULLER, supra
note 1, at 34.
89. SHIRER, supra note 60, at 226.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See MULLER, supra note 1, at 6.
93. Id. The lengthy probationary period necessitated by the lack of turnover
among sitting judges, combined with the modest remuneration and the require-
ments of a substantial financial deposit, limited access to the judiciary to the upper
classes. Supervisory positions in the judiciary generally were filled with public
prosecutors who were accustomed to complying with governmental dictates. Id.
at 7.
94. Id. at 8-11.
95. Id. at 15.
96. Id.
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faced a lengthy mandatory prison term and deportation.' He
nevertheless was sentenced to six months in prison with the
remainder of his sentence suspended.9" The tribunal explained
that "[i]n the case of a man whose thoughts and feelings are as
German as Hitler's, the court is of the opinion that the intent and
purpose of the law have no application."99
The conventional wisdom is that the judiciary was completely
purged and purified by the Hitlerite regime. 00 But, lawyers and
judges did not play a pronounced role in the National Socialist
movement."' Following the ascendancy of the Hitlerite regime,
only two long-time Nazis, Otto Thierack and Roland Freisler, held
prominent positions in the judiciary.1"2 Judicial posts under the
Third Reich generally remained the preserve of conservative
nationalists who eagerly embraced the ideology of National
Socialism. 3  Judges continually struggled to maintain their
professional independence and autonomy and resisted being
politically subordinated to the Nazi regime °4
The National Socialists adopted a series of statutes which
centralized judicial administration." 5 The Law for the Restora-
97. MULLER, supra note 1, at 16.
98. Id.
99. Id. In other instances, courts ruled that those targeted by the Nazi's anti-
semitic slurs could not claim the protection of the libel laws. Id. at 18-19. For a
full rendition of the judiciary's decisions, see id. at 10-24.
100. See James V. Bennett, Notes on the German Legal and Penal System, 37
J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 368, 370-71 (1947).
101. MULLER, supra note 1, at 39.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 37. The judicial candidate was compelled to complete an arduous
educational program. The National Socialist regime limited legal education to
those males who were deemed to be ideologically fit. Following the completion
of a three year law training, the candidate sat for an examination the successful
completion of which qualified the individual to assume the status of a Referenda.
This was followed by a period of three years of practical training. Those
successfully completing this preparatory service were eligible to apply to sit for a
second state examination, the Assessorexamen. The National Socialists introduced
a probationary period which was to be completed prior to an Assessor's eligibility
for appointment to the judiciary in order to test the candidate's political reliability.
The Nazi regime also abrogated the constitutional guarantee of life tenure for
judges. This process was further lengthened by the Nazi's imposition of an
obligatory six month term of service in the labor service and two years in the
military. In 1935, there were roughly 18,712 attorneys and 9,767 judges in the
Reich. See Burke Shartel and Hans Julius Wolff, German Lawyers- Training and
Functions, 42 MICH. L. REV. 521, 522-524 (1943). See also Stefan Riesenfeld, A
Comparison of Continental and American Legal Education, 36 MICH. L. REV. 31,
33-37 (1937).
105. See Programme of the German Workers' Party, supra note 28, at 474-485.
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tion of the Professional Civil Service of April 7, 1933, provided a
legal basis for the removal of Jews as well as those whose prior
political activity raised doubts concerning their capacity to act in
the interests of the National Socialist State.116 Civil servants also
could be transferred or forcibly retired.0 7 A second measure
affirmed that civil servants legally were obligated to comply with
the orders of governmental officials."8 In December 1934, the
Reich concentrated the administration of justice in the central
government."° The Fuhrer later granted to himself the preroga-
tive to issue pardons, a power which previously had been lodged in
state governments.110
Karl Linz, head of the German Federation of Judges, met with
Hitler in April 1933 and proclaimed that he was confident that the
Fuhrer would safeguard judicial independence."' The National
Socialist regime then proceeded to remove Social Democratic and
Jewish judges; 643 Jews were expelled from office in Prussia
alone. 112 The progressive Republican Federation of Judges also
was dissolved.113
State judicial associations affiliated with the German Federa-
tion of Judges immediately placed themselves under the direction
106. See Law For the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, (Apr. 7,
1933), in I NAZISM 1919-1945 A HISTORY IN DOCUMENTS AND EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNTS: THE NAZI PARTY, STATE AND SOCIETY, supra note 28, at 223-25.
107. Id. See also Decree, July 10, 1937, of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Concerning Appointment of Civil Servants and Termination of Civil Service
Status, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 183.
108. See Extract from the German Civil Service Law (Deutsches Beam-
tengesetz, or "DBG"), Jan. 26, 1937, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at
182. The Civil Service Law of Jan. 26, 1937, established that civil servants could
be compulsorily retired if they "could not be relied upon to support the National
Socialist State at all times." This was extended to the judiciary in July 1938. See
Programme of the German Workers' Party, supra note 28, at 485.
109. See Extracts from the Second Law Concerning the Transfer of the
Administration of Justice to the Reich, Dec. 5, 1934, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS.,
supra note 65, at 172. Courts were to "pronounce sentence in the name of the
German people." Extracts from the First Law for the Transfer of the Adminis-
tration of Justice to the Reich, Feb. 16, 1934, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note
65, at art. 1, 167, 168.
110. Decree, Sept. 3, 1939, of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Concerning
Execution of the Right of Pardon, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 186.
See also Letter from Lammers to Thierack, Oct. 23, 1942, Stating That the Opinion
of the Gauleiter Has to Accompany Clemency Cases Submitted to Hitler, in
JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 510.
111. MULLER, supra note 1, at 37.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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of the Federation of National Socialist Jurists and Adolf Hitler."4
The Federation declared at its national meeting, in May 1933, that
the organization's main task was to revise German law in accord-
ance with the National Socialist ideal."5 In October 1933, 10,000
lawyers raised their arms in the Nazi salute and swore "by the soul
of the German people" that they would "strive as German jurists
to follow the course of our Fuhrer to the end of our days."'16
The basic principle that the judge was "independent and
subject only to the law" remained unchanged.' However, Adolf
Hitler now was the single source of law and the sole autonomous
judge; subordinates were dutifully to conform to his commands."'
The judges' oath of office shifted the locus of their loyalty from the
State to the Fuhrer. 1 9
The status and security of judges was less certain under the
Civil Service Law of 1933, which abrogated life tenure for judg-
es."2  This apprehension was heightened by Hitler's April 26,
1942, speech to the Reichstag in which he attacked the paralysis of
legal principle and procedures. 2 ' The Fuhrer fulminated that
"Germany must not decline in order that formal law may live but
Germany must live irrespective of the contradictions of formal
justice.' ' 122 He warned that he would intervene to remove judges
whose decisions failed to fulfill the demands of National Social-
ism. 123 The Reichstag responded by authorizing the Fuhrer, as
"holder of the supreme judicial power," to "impose due punish-
114. Id. at 38.
115. Id.
116. MULLER, supra note 1, at 38.
117. Friedrich Roetter, The Impact of Nazi Law, 1945 WisC. L. REV. 516, 535.
118. Id.
119. Id. The oath required judges to avow that "I swear: I will be loyal and
obedient to the Fuehrer of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, to adhere
to the law, and to fulfill the duties of my office conscientiously so help me God."
Id.
120. See supra notes 100 and 101 and accompanying texts.
121. Extract from Hitler's Speech to the German Reichstag, Apr. 26, 1942,
Requesting Confirmation of the Right to Keep Everyone at His Duty and
Expressing His Intention to Intervene Where Judges "Do Not Understand the
Demand of the Hour," in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 436-37 (emphasis
omitted). The case which precipitated Hitler's speech involved an individual who
ill-treated his wife and received five years in prison. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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ment, and to remove anyone from his post, rank and posi-
tion . . . without using prescribed procedures.,
124
In a July 1942 speech to the People's Court, Reich Minister
Josef Goebbels, Head of Cultural Affairs, again warned that
unsuitable judges would be removed from office.125 He lectured
that expediency, rather than a legally defensible result, should be
the touchstone of judicial decisions.126  The notion that judges
were required to be convinced of a defendant's guilt was antiquat-
ed; those who threatened the State were to be "wiped out.
127
The sacrifices made by the mass of citizens during the war dictated
that even minor transgressions should be met with capital punish-
ment.1"
The traditional role of a judge was radically revised. Judges
were no longer to look to the law as an autonomous avenue of
rational reasoning.129 Legal methodology, henceforth, was to be
informed by National Socialist ideology as explicated in the party
program and the Fuhrer's speeches.130
Judicial self-government also was limited. A March 21, 1942,
decree provided that various administrative decisions were to be
decided by the chief judge of each court in accordance with orders
issued by the Reich Ministry of Justice. 31 The chief judge was no
longer expected to consult with the presidents of the various
judicial senates and with the highest ranking associate judge.132
He also was to be held responsible for his subordinate courts
reaching verdicts which were in accord with National Socialist
doctrine and was authorized to disregard the views of other
jurists."' In addition, jurists were instructed to expedite proce-
124. Unanimous Decision of the Greater German Reichstag, Apr. 26, 1942,
Concerning Unrestricted Powers of Adolf Hitler, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra
note 65, at 204-05.
125. Summary By Dr. Crohne of the Reich Ministry of Justice Concerning
Goebbels' Speech to the Members of the People's Court, July 22, 1942, in JUSTICE
CASE DOCS. supra note 65, at 452-53.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
130. Id.
131. See Fuehrer Decree, Mar. 21, 1942, Concerning Simplification of the
Administration of Justice, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at para. III, 203
[hereinafter Simplification of the Administration of Justice].
132. Id.
133. See Extracts from Decree of Aug. 13, 1942 for the Further Simplification
of the Administration of Justice in Criminal Cases, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra
note 65, at art. IV, 206-07. See also Roetter, supra note 117, at 537-38.
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dures and to draft decisions in a clear and concise style.134 Justice
Minister Franz Schlegelberger attempted to blunt criticism of the
judiciary by initiating criminal proceedings against two notaries.135
One notary was accused of having purchased a picture postcard
from a Jewish merchant. 13 6 The Party Court concluded that this
indicated that the accused had failed to assimilate the importance
of opposing world Jewry.
13 7
Schlegelberger also invited Hitler to inform him of verdicts
with which the Fuhrer disagreed so that Schlegelberger might
educate judges into the "correct way of thinking." '138 In March
1941, Hitler objected to a district court's recognition of extenuating
circumstances in a rape case.139 The Court had reasoned that
Polish farmhands lacked the sexual restraint of German work-
ers.140 Schlegelberger responded by dismissing the presiding
judge of the penal chamber of the Lueneburg District Court as well
the associate judges involved in the case.141 The Fuhrer also
disputed the thirty-month sentence meted out to Markus Luftgas,
a Jew charged with hoarding 65,000 eggs.142  Schlegelberger
responded by turning Luftglass over to the Gestapo for execu-
tion.143 Schlegelberger subsequently urged the Presidents of the
134. See Simplification of the Administration of Justice, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at para. I.
135. Two Orders Signed by Defendant Schlegelberger for the Initiation of
Criminal Proceedings Against Notaries Because of Their Attitude Toward the
National Socialist State, May 19, 1938 and Dec. 6, 1938, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS.,
supra note 65, at 363-65. The other notary allegedly had failed to support the
absorption of Austria in a referendum and only had reluctantly adopted the
German Salute in Court and opposed the Nazi Party. Id. at 364.
136. Id. at 363-65.
137. Id.
138. Letters from Defendant Schlegelberger to Hitler and Lammers, March
1941 and March 1942, Concerning Judicial Sentences Displeasing Hitler and
Proposing Participation in Civil Proceedings by Public Prosecutors, in JUSTICE
CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 417. Schlegelberger also proposed that public
prosecutors intervene into civil actions in order to assert the interests of the
national community against the interests of the private parties. Id.
139. Correspondence Between the Reich Chancellery and Defendant Schlegel-
berger, March and April 1941, After Hitler Had Expressed Displeasure at a
Sentence Granting Extenuating Circumstances to a Pole, in JUSTICE CASE Docs.,
supra note 65, at 421-24.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 423-24.
142. See Correspondence Between Lammers, Schaub, and Defendant Schlegel-
berger, October 1941, Concerning Transfer of Markus Luftgas to the Gestapo for
Execution, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 429-31.
143. Id.
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District Courts of Appeal to heed Hitler's call to impose the death
penalty on individuals impeding the war effort.1"
Otto Thierack, Schlegelberger's successor as Justice Minister,
issued a series of Judges' Letters intended to assist jurists to reach
decisions which served the interests of the national community.'45
Thierack described judges as the direct assistants of Adolf Hitler,
who was the leader of the nation and the supreme judge. 14 6
Jurists were charged with aiding in the "annihilation of the
unworthy" and with combating the "diseases in the body of the
nation.' 4 7 This required an "elite" corps of judges who did not
"slavishly cling to the letter of the law" in developing decisions
which served as the "best guide for the life of the community.""14
These judgments should be informed by an awareness of the aims
and aspirations of the leadership of the State.'49
Thierack pointed to several opinions which exemplified the
judiciary's erroneous application of the law. He criticized a court's
determination that the snatching of a handbag during a blackout
constituted theft, rather than robbery, due to the absence of
force.5 ° Thierack admonished that the intricacies of legal anal-
144. See Circular Letter from Defendant Schlegelberger to Presidents of District
Courts of Appeal, Dec. 15, 1941, Quoting from a Speech by Hitler and Stating that
Judges and Public Prosecutors Must Keep Hitler's Words in Mind, in JUSTICE
CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 432. In order to insulate the judiciary from
interference and intervention, Schlegelberger proposed that the authority to
confirm sentences should be placed under the control the Reich Minister of
Justice. The Presidents of the Courts of Appeal would be authorized to fix
punishments. The Reich Minister of Justice also would be authorized to remove
cases from a criminal court which evidenced an inability to preside over a case.
See Four Communications, May-June 1942, Concerning the Authority for the
Confirmation of Sentences, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 438-39.
Martin Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancellery, objected to the Fuhrer
delegating the right to correct sentences and pointed to the fact that the Ministry
of Justice and judicial officers could not be relied upon to correct inappropriate
decisions. See Letter by Bormann Opposing Schlegelberger's Proposed Decree
and File Note by Lammers Concerning It, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65,
at 442.
145. Circular Letter from Thierack to Judges, Sept. 7, 1942, Explaining the
Establishment and Function of the Judges' Letters, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra
note 65, at 523-24.
146. The First Issue of the Judges' Letters, Oct. 1, 1942, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 525.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 526.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 529.
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ysis were not decisive.' The death penalty, rather than two
years in prison, should have been meted out to the defendant
whose endangerment of the streets was tantamount to treason. 52
Invoking the familiar medical metaphor, Thierack proclaimed that
it was better for the judge to exterminate the "bacillus" than
confront a "contaminated multitude later on." '153
Thierack criticized the Court of Guardians for sentencing two
Jehovah's Witnesses to probation for refusing to inculcate their
daughter with Nazi ideology.154 The Court determined that the
parents otherwise were raising their daughter in a responsible
fashion and that it was sufficient for them to agree that they would
refrain from impeding their daughter's education.155 Thierack
admonished that National Socialist jurisprudence dictated that
parents exhibiting indifference to the obligations of Reich citizen-
ship should be adjudged unfit to raise their child.156
Thierack also instructed judges to distinguish between German
and Jewish defendants.'57 A District Court was criticized for
sentencing a Jewish defendant to two years in prison for currency
violations.5 Thierack noted that the Court erroneously had
imposed a punishment which was suitable for a German defen-
dant.159  The defendant, however, was a Jew-a member of a
group which had plundered Germany and had compiled a consider-
able fortune. 6" The Justice Minister advised that these parasites
merited the most severe punishment available.'
16
The Ministry of Justice regularly convened meetings with
prosecutors and the presidents of district courts and required the
presidents to submit reports in order to coordinate the judicial
response to politically significant cases.162 The judiciary also was
151. The First Issue of the Judges' Letters, Oct. 1, 1942, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 529.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 530.
154. Extracts from Issue No. 3 of the Judges' Letters, Dec. 1, 1942, Summariz-
ing Two Cases and Giving in Each Case the Opinion of the Reich Minister of
Justice, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 537-39.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. The First Issue of the Judges' Letters, Oct. 1, 1942, in JUSTICE CASE
Docs., supra note 65, at 533-34.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Report from Defendant Rothenberger to Defendant Schlegelberger,
May 11, 1942, Noting Rothenberger's Intention to Intensify "The International
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under constant pressure and scrutiny from the Security Police
163
and intelligence agencies."64 Judges generally relented, acquiesc-
ing, for example, in the Gestapo's demand that they refrain from
inquiring into the apparent mistreatment of detainees appearing
before their court. 65
Some Nazi loyalists remained critical of the judiciary's
continued independence and autonomy. The Chief of the Security
Police submitted a report to the Ministry of Justice, in September
1942, which noted that the efforts to control judicial decision-
making had not achieved the desired uniformity."6 These inno-
vations merely had succeeded in burdening, delaying and paralyzing
the disposition of cases.167 He advised that the appropriate
outcomes could be achieved only through the political and
ideological indoctrination of the judiciary."
State Secretary Curt Rothenberger drafted a memo, in
rebuttal, which articulated a vision of an independent judiciary
which was compatible with National-Socialism. 69 He argued that
an autonomous and respected judicial branch was essential to the
creation of a strong, stable State which was free from crime and
corruption. 7 °
Direction and Steering of the Administration of Justice," and Enclosing Copies of
Rothenberger's Instructions to Judges in His District, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS.,
supra note 65, at 483, 486-88.
163. See Report from the President of the Court of Appeal in Hamm, July 7,
1942, Concerning the Alarm Among Judges Caused by Hitler's Reichstag Speech
of Apr. 26, 1942, and Certain Activities of the Gestapo and the Nazi Party Affect-
ing Legal Matters, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 448-51.
164. See Letter from the President of the Berlin Court of Appeal to Defendant
Schlegelberger, Jan. 3, 1942, Commenting Upon "Influence Exerted Upon the
Judges," in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 433. The President of the
Berlin Court of Appeal complained that prosecutors were approaching judges
during trial in order to convey the view of the Justice Ministry concerning the
appropriate sentence. Judges often agreed to mete out a sentence prior to the
closing arguments, reducing the attorney's arguments to a mere formality. The
President of the Court of Appeals requested that prosecutors refrain from ap-
proaching judges immediately before trial. Id. at 435-36.
165. Roetter, supra note 117, at 539.
166. Secret Report of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Sept. 3, 1942,
Concerning "The Control of Penal Jurisdiction" and the Reactions of Judges
Thereto, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 454, 459-60.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 456.
169. Correspondence Between the Reich Chancellery and Hitler's Adjutant,
May and June 1942, Mentioning that Hitler Had Considered "Noteworthy" the
Rothenberger Memorandum on Judicial Reform, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra
note 65, at 467, 473-74.
170. Id.
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Rothenberger's report, which reportedly was well received by
Hitler, portrayed party activists as impatient with the impediments
created by legal rules and procedures.17 1 On the other hand,
members of the judiciary complained about innovations in legal
procedures and the decline in their position and prestige.
172
Rothenberger, as a compromise, proposed the creation of an
independent, but avowedly National Socialist judiciary.173  He
conceded that, as presently constituted, the judiciary was ill-
prepared to "judge 'like the Fuehrer. '" 174  His solution was the
appointment of a new breed of jurists who were capable of
representing the "one law and the one justice.' ' 175 These were to
be mature individuals, recruited from outside civil service channels,
and schooled to eschew logical and abstract thinking in favor of a
methodology based upon "'practical everyday life. '
176
IV. The Legal Profession
A. Purging the Legal Profession
The Association for National Socialist German Jurists
(BNSDJ) was established in 1928 under the leadership of Hans
Frank. 77 The Association held little appeal for the established
legal elite and, as late as 1932, had attracted only 1347 mem-
bers.17  These lawyers primarily were drawn from the ranks of
young jurists and the least successful members of the profes-
sion. 179  The National Socialists' electoral success attracted -an
increasing number of adherents and enrollment had more than
doubled by the time that Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor."8
171. Id. at 470.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 474.
174. Correspondence Between the Reich Chancellery and Hitler's Adjutant,
May and June 1942, Mentioning that Hitler Had Considered "Noteworthy" the
Rothenberger Memorandum on Judicial Reform, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra
note 65, at 474.
175. Id. at 478 (emphasis omitted).
176. Id. (emphasis omitted).
177. See Kenneth C.H. Willig, The Bar in the Third Reich, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 1, 3-4 (1976). On the history of the modern German legal profession, see
Kenneth F. Ledford, German Lawyers and the State in the Weimar Republic, 13 L.
& HIST. REV. 117 (1995). See generally Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparing Legal
Professions Cross-nationally: From a Professions-centered to a State-centered
Approach, 1987 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 415 (1986).
178. Willig, supra note 177, at 3.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 4.
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Many of these individuals were motivated by expediency and
pragmatism. 81 Others joined in response to the insecurity caused
by an expanding and socially diversified legal profession which was
experiencing a decline in income, political power and social
prestige. 2 Three-fourths of the bar was suffering from severe
economic and social dislocation and the National Socialist plan to
purge the legal profession of Jews, other non-Aryans and women
appeared to offer an economic elixir. 83
On March 26, 1933, the administrative council of the German
Bar proclaimed its support for the Nazi regime's nationalistic
program. 1"4 Following the National Socialist's April electoral
victory, Bar President Rudolf Dix endorsed Hitler's reconstruction
of the Reich and requested the Jewish members of the Bar Council
to resign.185 Membership in the BNSDJ increased to roughly
70,000 during the first few months of Hitler's ascendancy to
power."6 In March 1944, existing local and national bar associa-
tions proclaimed their desire to exclude non-Aryans from legal
practice and were voluntarily incorporated into the BNSDJ.' 8
Nazi ideologue Julius Streicher issued a steady stream of anti-
semitic slander which identified Jewish lawyers with corruption, the
coddling of criminals, and sexual perversity."8 Carl Schmidt-the
leading conservative academic-decried the Jewish influence in
legal science and organized a conference which condemned the
semitic ideas which had been insinuated into bankruptcy, criminal
and Roman law.'89 Hundreds of articles, court opinions and
speeches were issued during the first few years of the Hitlerite
regime which augmented this attack on the "Jewish features" of the
legal system 9 °
The Civil Service Law of 1933 led to the purging from govern-
ment of suspected dissidents and Jews who had not participated in
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Willig, supra note 177, at 4.
184. Udo Reifner, The Bar in the Third Reich: Anti-Semitism and the Decline
of Liberal Advocacy, 32 McGILL L.J. 96, 116 (1986).
185. Id. at 116.
186. Id. at 105.
187. Willig, supra note 177, at 4-5. The exclusion of Jews did little to solve the
economic exigency experienced by members of the German legal profession. See
Reifner, supra note 184, at 121.
188. Reifner, supra note 184, at 107-08.
189. Id. at 122.
190. Id.
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the First World War.'9 ' This resulted in roughly 1500 lawyers
being expelled from the public service, ninety percent of whom
were Jews.1 92 In April 1933, the National Socialist regime also
passed the Law Concerning Admission to The Bar which revoked
the membership of lawyers discharged from the civil service and
prohibited the admission of non-Aryans as well as individuals who
had undertaken communist activities.193  The statute exempted
World War I veterans and those whose admission pre-dated the
Weimar Republic."
These legislative initiatives resulted in the exclusion from
practice of a modest percentage of Jewish lawyers. 195 The re-
mainder were expelled in 1938.196 Law faculties also were
cleansed of roughly twenty-two percent of their faculties."9 This
primarily was comprised of prominent Catholic, Jewish and
politically liberal academics. 98
B. Reorganizing the Legal Profession
The National Bar Association was reorganized into the
National Lawyer's Chamber (RRAK) in 1 9 3 4 199 This resulted in
the creation of a centralized and hierchical government licensing,
regulatory and disciplinary agency.2°° Political purity, rather than
191. See Law, Apr. 7, 1933, Concerning Admission to the Bar in JUSTICE CASE
Docs., supra note 65, at 164-65.
192. Reifner, supra note 184, at 117.
193. Law, Apr. 7, 1933, Concerning Admission to the Bar, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 164-65. In 1933, female lawyers were denied access to the
legal profession and elderly attorneys were forced into retirement. Reifner, supra
note 184, at 117.
194. Law, Apr. 7, 1933, Concerning Admission to the Bar, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 164-65.
195. Willig, supra note 177, at 5. Prior to these restrictions, sixteen percent of
the legal profession was Jewish. Id. In Berlin, Jews constituted a majority of the
legal profession. Id. Only 487 of the city's 1998 Jewish lawyers were disbarred in
1933. Id. In Jan. 1937, 32.6 percent of the Berlin bar remained non-Aryan. Id.
196. Reifner supra note 184, at 118-19. In 1933, there were 19,276 advocates
and 9943 judges in a German population of 70 million. Id. at 104. 4394 members
of the German bar were Jewish. Id. In 1943, the number of judges and lawyers
had declined to 1600 and 12,000 respectively. Id. at 104-05.
197. See Detlev F. Vagts, International Law In the Third Reich, 84 AM. J. INT'L
L. 661, 676 (1990).
198. Id. at 676. See also James Wilford Garner, The Nazi Proscription of
German Professors of International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 112, 114 (1939). A
significant number of the prominent Jewish lawyers who had been expelled met
tragic fates. See Reifner, supra note 184, at 120.
199. Willig, supra note 177, at 6.
200. Id. at 6-7.
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professional competence, was established as the requisite for
admission to the bar.20'
Law students were to be inculcated with the Nazi worldview.
The German statute on legal education proclaimed' that "German
legal science is ... National-Socialist., 22  The core curriculum
was infused with Nazi ideology and stressed the relationships
between blood and soil and between race and culture.23 The
comprehensive legal examination, administered following candi-
dates' completion of law school, was supplemented by a character
test.2°  This examined candidates' ability to undergo physical
hardship, devotion to the Nazi cause and comprehension of
National Socialist doctrine.2 5 Those who passed the character
test, but flunked the academic component, customarily were
permitted to retake the exam or had their results annulled by the
Fuhrer.2 °6
Those admitted to the legal profession were required to swear
an oath of personal loyalty to Adolf Hitler.2 7 The new constitu-
tion of the German Bar declared in the preamble that the lawyer
was a central component of the German administration of justice
and was required to subordinate his legal skills to the National
Socialist cause.2" Those who contravened their broad-ranging
ethical obligations were subject to prosecution before disciplinary
courts which were authorized to disbar and fine attorneys. 20 9
Lawyers were disbarred for failing to vote in elections and
plebescites and for socializing with Jews. 210 Attorneys also were
expelled for sharing fees with disbarred Jewish lawyers, neglecting
to greet colleagues with the Nazi salute and for failing to contribute
to the Nazi Party.211
201. Id.
202. Max Rheinstein, Law Faculties and Law Schools: A Comparison of Legal
Education in the United States and Germany, 1938 WIsc. L. REV. 5, 29 (Annex,
Maxims for the Study of Legal Science, issued by the Reich and Prussian Minister
of Education, Jan. 18, 1935).
203. Id. at sec. 4(2)-(3), 36.
204. Id. at 550.
205. Id. at 551.
206. Id. at 550-51.
207. Willig, supra note 177, at 7. For the text of the oath, see Roetter, supra
note 117, at 542.
208. Willig, supra note 177, at 7.
209. Id. at 7-8.
210. Id.
211. Reifner, supra note 184, at 112-13.
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Lawyers were also required to receive approval from govern-
ment and party officials, as well as from the chief judge of the
relevant court, prior to undertaking the representation of political
dissidents.2 12 Attorneys' contact with their clients and access to
evidence and witnesses was subject to the consent of the prosecu-
tor.2 13 A lawyer whose client committed perjury or attacked a
court's decision was considered an accomplice in his client's
crime.2 14 An attorney lodging a civil case against the police and
security services also risked arrest and confinement in a concentra-
tion camp."'
In one case, an attorney withdrew from the representation of
the son of a family friend who had been arrested, along with other
Catholic activists, for engaging in an anti-government protest.216
The lawyer was acquitted of contravening the common front
against "political Catholicism" after explaining that he had
undertaken the representation in order to discover the identity of
the leaders of the agitation.2 17
The fate of well-known defense attorney Harry Litten
illustrates the continuing threat confronting independent-minded
lawyers and the National Socialist's conflation of political liberalism
and anti-semitism. Litten had obtained the acquittal of a member
of the Communist Party accused of killing a member of the
Security Service.21 8 The Nazi regime unsuccessfully sought to
persuade Litten to testify that his client had perjured himself on the
stand.219 The police then subjected Litten to a cycle of abuse and
torture and launched a public campaign against "'Jewish attorney
Litten.' ' 220 Although the authorities were aware that Litten was
not a Jew, he was interned in the Jewish compound of a concentra-
tion camp and executed in 1937.221
212. Willig, supra note 177, at 8.
213. Id. at 9.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 8-11. The economically precarious position of lawyers placed them
in a vulnerable situation. Judges refused to assign cases or to award fees to overly
aggressive defense attorneys. Reifner, supra note 185, at 113.
216. Roetter, supra note 117, at 543.
217. Id.
218. Reifner, supra note 184, at 108-09.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 109.
221. Id.
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C Lawyers' Letters
Hitler predictably held lawyers in low regard, variously
referring to attorneys as "'traitors,"' "'idiots"' and "'absolute
cretins. ,,212 He noted that they were "essentially unclean" and
were accustomed to resorting to the "lie" in their defense of the
"'underworld.' ' 223 The Fuhrer vowed, in 1942, "'[t]o make every
German realize that it is a disgrace to be a lawyer.'
' 224
Justice Minister Otto Thierack assured the Fuhrer that he
would insure that lawyers adhered to the dictates of National
Socialist ideology.25 He instituted a series of Lawyers' Letters
which reminded attorneys that they were part of the fighting force
of the Reich and that they were expected to devote themselves to
the safeguarding of national security.2 26
Thierack noted that although judicial procedures had been
subject to minor modification, the role of defense attorneys had
been radically revised. 227 Defense attorneys were to continue as
advocates for the accused, but their primary responsibility was to
serve the interests of the Reich. 28
Criminal lawyers were to strive to achieve a verdict which
contributed to the welfare of society rather than an acquittal or
reduction of sentence.22 9 This required defense attorneys to
cooperate with prosecutors and judges in properly disposing of
defendants." Defendants no longer were to be judged solely in
accordance with legal technicalities. 23 1 They, instead, were to be
evaluated in accordance with their character and devotion to the
National Socialist cause.232
Thierack selected various cases which illustrated the failure of
defense attorneys to appreciate that they were to function as
"administrators of justice" rather than as a "unilateral representa-
222. Willig, supra note 177, at 11.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 13.
225. See Extracts from Lawyers' Letter No. 1 Signed by Reich Minister of
Justice Thierack, Oct. 1, 1944, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 554-55.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 561.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 564.
230. Extracts from Lawyers' Letter No. 1 Signed by Reich Minister of Justice
Thierack, Oct. 1, 1944, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 564.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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tive of the interests of the defendant. 2 33  He pointed to the
lawyer for two women accused of demonstrating kindness to Allied
prisoners who had pled that he would be pleased if German
prisoners were shown the same solicitude.234 Thierack admon-
ished that it was inappropriate to demonstrate kindness to enemies
of the Reich and condemned the attorney for encouraging anti-
social behavior.235
Defense attorneys also were warned against diminishing the
significance of their client's criminal actions and burdening the
courts with petitions for mitigation and mercy.236  The proper
course was to cooperate with the court in instructing the accused
on the required canons of conduct.237 In one instance, an attor-
ney vigorously demanded the acquittal of a factory owner who had
violated food regulations in order to feed his workers.2 38 Thier-
ack attacked the lawyer for having imparted the impression that a
criminal conviction and sentence would be unfair and contrary to
the societal interest. 39
Thierack further criticized defense attorneys for vigorously
cross-examining complainants.2" A lawyer, in one case, disputed
whether a statement to a women which denigrated her son, who
had been killed in the war, constituted defamation.24' The
attorney suggested that the mother was hysterical and high-
strung.242 Thierack admonished that "[h]e who tries to cover such
a criminal deed, particularly as a representative of the law, puts
himself ideologically on a level with the defendant." '243
Those lawyers deemed fit to practice thus were expected to
share a unanimity of aim with prosecutors and judges. The final
diminution in the independent status of the legal profession
occurred in 1943, when attorneys were stripped of their distinctive
status and placed under the jurisdiction of the civil service
233. Id. at 561.
234. Id. at 566.
235. Extracts from Lawyers' Letter No. 1 Signed by Reich Minister of Justice
Thierack, Oct. 1, 1944, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 566.
236. Id. at 567
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Extracts from Lawyers' Letter No. 1 Signed by Reich Minister of Justice
Thierack, Oct. 1, 1944, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 567.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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disciplinary court.2 " In addition to transforming the judiciary and
legal profession, the National Socialists initiated a radical reorgani-
zation of the courts.
V. The Reorganization of the Courts
A. Special Court
A March 1933 decree created Special Courts within the district
of each court of appeal.245  The judges were drawn from the
district from which the Special Court was established. The Special
Courts initially were provided with jurisdiction over offenses
established by the February 28, 1933, decree suspending constitu-
tional rights. This included inciting disobedience to government
orders, sabotage and the assassination of governmental officials. 24
Proceedings were expedited. Special Courts were authorized
to issue arrest warrants2 47 and to commit defendants to trial
without a hearing.248 The judges also were authorized to refuse
any evidence which was considered unnecessary "for clearing up
the case., 249 Most significantly, legal appeals were not provided
against the decisions of the Special Courts.2 °  This effectively
permitted the judges to conduct trials without regard for procedural
requirements.51 Sentences immediately were to be meted out in
those instances in which an offender was apprehended in the course
of a criminal act or in which his or her guilt was obvious. 2 2
The jurisdiction of the Special Courts later was expanded to
include a wide range of offenses, including listening to prohibited
radio broadcasts and offenses against the war economy.253
Jurisdiction also was provided over offenses in which prosecution
was required by the "gravity or the wickedness of the act, by the
244. Willig, supra note 177, at 14.
245. Decree of the Reich Government, Mar. 21, 1933, on the Formation of
Special Courts, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, arts. 1, 2, 4, at 218-19
[hereinafter Special Courts].
246. Id. art. 9, at 219-20.
247. Id.
248. Id. art. 11, at 220.
249. Id. art. 13, at 221.
250. Special Courts, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, art. 16(1), at 221.
251. Id. art. 13, at 221.
252. Special Courts, Decree of Feb. 21, 1940, Concerning Jurisdiction of
Criminal Courts, Special Courts, and Additional Provisions of Criminal Procedure,
in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, art. 23, at 222-24 [hereinafter Special
Courts II].
253. Id. art. 13, at 223.
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public excitement aroused or in consideration of a serious threat to
public order or security. 2 54
The increasing number of prosecutions required a continuous
expansion of Special Courts."s Reich Minister of Justice Otto
Thierack wrote a memo in 1943, pointing out that practically all
criminal cases were being brought before the Special Courts. The
Special Courts, as a result, no longer were able to sentence
offenders swiftly and the proliferation of panels threatened the
uniformity of sentences. 2 6 Thierack also complained that there
was a shortage of politically qualified jurists to staff the courts. 7
The increasing resort to Special Courts is illustrated by the fact that
in Hamburg, between 1936 and 1939, one out of every six criminal
trials was conducted before Special Courts.258  By 1943, this
number had risen to two-thirds of all criminal cases. 59
As the German war effort faltered, judges on the Special Court
issued increasingly draconian decisions. For instance, in 1944,
office messenger Georg Hopfe, along with two others, broke into
a burning building and rescued valuables. 26°  Hopfe helped
himself to a bottle of perfume and placed a knockwurst in his coat
pocket while his companion day laborer Fritz Nauland snatched
two bars of soap.261 Hopfe and Nauland were brought before the
Weimar Special Court which, despite testimony that Hopfe was
mentally challenged, sentenced both defendants to death.262 The
Court stressed that the value of the property was irrelevant; the
commission of this "despicable crime" had placed the defendants
"outside the bounds of society., 263
254. Id. art. 14, at 223.
255. See Letter from Under Secretary Freisler to Presidents and Public
Prosecutors at Courts of Appeal, Sept. 26, 1941, Concerning Handling of Certain
Wartime Crimes by Special Courts to Speed Up Proceedings, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 226. Cases were to be processed expeditiously and a
Court was considered "overloaded" if a monthly average of more than forty new
indictments was filed. Id.
256. Id.
257. See Special Courts II, Letter from Thierack, Reich Minister of Justice, to
Presidents of Courts of Appeal, July 5, 1943, Discussing Development and
Effectiveness of Special Courts and Proposing Limitations on Their Jurisdiction,
in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 227-29. Thierack urged that the Special
Courts transfer trivial cases to regular courts. Id. at 230.
258. Id.
259. MULLER, supra note 1, at 158.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 159.
263. Id.
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The Special Court was particularly harsh on crimes deemed to
have been committed by exploiting wartime conditions. Hugo
Gohring, a railroad worker and the father of seven, was condemned
to death for removing items from damaged packages which he was
unloading.2 6  The Special Court reasoned that the defendant's
delicts had been facilitated by the fact that only low-quality
packaging materials were available as a result of the war.265
B. The People's Court
The People's Court was established immediately following the
Reichstag Fire case.266 The Court was to adjudicate charges of
treason and high treason which formerly fell within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.267 The Tribunal was to sit in
five judge panels, only two members of which were required to be
professional judges.' The lay judges generally were drawn from
the military, security services and party hierarchy.269 The Special
Court was divided into six sections serving various geographic areas
264. MULLER, supra note 1, at 156-57.
265. Id. at 157.
266. SHIRER, supra note 60, at 371.
267. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. High treason entailed acts
undertaken to incorporate German territory or to detach territory from the Reich
through violence or the threat of violence. See Extracts from the Law, Apr. 24,
1934, Amending Provisions of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, in JUSTICE
CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at art. 80, 169. Treason entailed acts undertaken on
behalf of a foreign government with the intention of causing a war or forcible
measures against the Reich or causing other serious disadvantages. Id. art. 91, at
171.
268. Extract from Law of Apr. 24, 1934 Amending Regulations of Penal Law
and Criminal Procedure, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 231-233. The
scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction later was expanded to include various acts of
sabotage and economic sabotage. See Extracts from Decree, Feb. 21, 1940,
Concerning the Jurisdiction of Criminal Courts, Special Courts, and Additional
Provisions of Criminal Procedure, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 234-
35.
269. Letter from the Office of the Supreme Chief of the SA, Signed by
Defendant Klemm, Dec. 4, 1936, Proposing Five SA Leaders as Associate Judges
of the People's Court, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 235. By the end
of 1941, the People's Court consisted of six senates with seventy-eight professional
judges and seventy-four prosecutors. KOCH, supra note 1, at 90. These
professional judges and prosecutors, with the exception of three judges and two
prosecutors, were all members of the National Socialist Party. Id. Most had
joined after Hitler's ascendance to power. Id. There were eighty-one lay
judges-seventy-one were Nazi Party functionaries and the remainder were Wehr-
macht officers of at least the rank of colonel. Id.
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in Germany and the occupied territories. 7 A Special Senate was
established to review decisions.
2 71
The Court's august stature was indicated by Hitler's decree
that the judges sitting on the People's Court were to wear the red
robe which formerly had been reserved for the Supreme Court.27 2
This symbolized the fact that the Court was to combat enemies at
home in the same way that the military fought foes abroad.2 73
The decisions of the People's Court became progressively
draconian.274  In 1943 3338 sentences were meted out.275 These
sentences included 1662 death sentences and 876 sentences of
between five and fifteen years of hard labor; 181 persons were
acquitted and 723 cases were settled through alternative ave-
nues.276 The latter expression was a euphemism connoting that
the defendants had been handed over to the Gestapo for execu-
tion.277 In 1942, 1192 persons were sentenced to death; and in
1944, an additional 2097 individuals were subjected to capital
punishment.27" Death sentences comprised between forty-six and
forty-nine percent of the Court's verdicts between 1942 and 1944,
while acquittals ranged from between four and eleven percent.
279
Reich Justice Minister Otto Thierack, fearing a popular reaction
against the Court's repressive decisions, advised Otto Freisler, his
successor as President of the People's Court, that judges who were
capable of calmly and clearly explaining the basis of their judg-
ments should be selected in political cases.2s
270. Memorandum from Freisler, President of the People's Court, Apr. 1, 1944,
Concerning Assignment of Various Types of Cases to the Several Senates of the
People's Court, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 238.
271. Extracts from Law of Sept. 16, 1939, Amending Regulations of General
Criminal Procedure, Military Procedure and the Penal Code, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 233.
272. MULLER, supra note 1, at 142.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 143.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Letter from Freisler, President of the People's Court, to the Reich Minister
of Justice, Jan. 17, 1944, Transmitting Summary of Activity of the People's Court
from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1943, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 236, 237.
278. MULLER, supra note 1, at 143 (Table 1).
279. See KOCH, supra note 1, at 234.
280. See Letter from the Reich Minister of Justice to the President of the
People's Court, Oct. 18, 1944, Commenting Upon Its Functions and the Selection
of Presiding Judges "In Particularly Important Political Cases," in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 241-42. Thierack suggested that the Court had provided
an overly expansive definition of statements which were encompassed within the
delict of defeatism. Id. at 242.
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A disproportionate number of defendants were charged with
undermining morale. A statute required the imposition of capital
punishment against any individual who "publicly attempts to
paralyze or undermine the will of the German or an allied nation
to defend itself."'  Courts reasoned that even a private remark
could potentially be transmitted to a larger audience or might
influence public opinion and therefore fell within the statute.'
Oskar Beck, a half-Jewish, Austrian radio repairman, and former
Social Democrat, was sentenced to death for remarking to one of
his female customers that "[d]o you know that every woman who
goes out to work, sends a soldier to his death." '283 The People's
Court ruled that Beck had knowingly and intentionally impaired
the willingness of his customer and others to support the war
effort.2  Beck's remark had the effect of undermining the
morale and will to self-preservation of the German people.2"
The Court, in its concluding remarks, noted that the purpose of the
ordinance was "not merely to prevent any undermining of the
people's will to self-preservation, but to prevent all possibility of
undermining it." 6
Another set of cases involved prosecutions for providing
assistance to an enemy power or placing the army of the Reich at
a disadvantage. Any expression of doubt concerning the outcome
of the war was interpreted by the People's Court as providing aid
and comfort to the enemy.' For example, the Dutch pianist
Karlrobert Kreiten, while on a concert tour in Berlin, remarked to
a family friend that Hitler was sick and mentally disturbed.288 He
was convicted of treason and executed for having engaged in a
"scurrilous attack on the confidence of a member of the German
nation. ,289
281. MULLER, supra note 1, at 145.
282. Id. at 146-47.
283. The Beck Case, Apr. 5-Sept. 21, 1943. Extracts from the Official Files
Including Report of Local Nazi Official, Apr. 5, 1943; Report to the Gestapo in
Vienna, June 4, 1943; Letter from Defendant Barnickel to the President of the
People's Court, July 30, 1943, Enclosing Indictment Signed by Barnickel; and
Judgment of the People's Court After Trial of Sept. 20, 1943, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 873, 876.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 879. For a number of comments which constituted capital offenses,
see MULLER, supra note 1, at 146.
287. See, e.g., MULLER, supra note 1, at 147.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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Roland Freisler, in a letter to Otto Thierack in 1944, captured
the combative culture of the People's Court.2 Freisler observed
that the People's Court must adhere to the ideology of the National
Socialist regime and that "the human fate which depends on it is
only secondary .... [T]he accused . . . are only little figures of a
much greater circle standing behind them which fights the Reich.
Above all this is true in war time." '291
C. Health Courts
In 1933, health courts were established to preside over the
Nazi regime's sterilization of individuals with hereditary diseas-
es.292 Those required to submit to sterilization included indivi-
duals suffering from imbecility, schizophrenia, manic-depressive
psychosis, epilepsy, Huntingtonian Chorea, hereditary blindness,
deafness, physical malformation and chronic alcoholism.293  An
application for sterilization could be submitted by the individual,
his or her guardian, a public health officer or a medical superinten-
dent.2 94 The authorities were authorized to conduct the opera-
tion, "even [if] against the will of the person to -be sterilized., 295
The three-person hereditary health court was attached to local
civil courts and was comprised of a local court judge, a public
health officer and a physician with expert knowledge of eugen-
ics. 296 The Court possessed the discretion to exclude legal counsel
from the hearings. 29  Special training courses were conducted to
acquaint judges with hereditary diseases. 29s
In 1934, 191 health courts and appellate health courts were
established.299 Courts decided in favor of sterilization in over
290. KOCH, supra note 1, at 127.
291. Id. (emphasis omitted)
292. Law of July 4, 1933 for the Prevention of Progeny With Hereditary
Diseases, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, art. 1, 243.
293. Id.
294. Id. arts. 2-4, at 243-44.
295. Id. art. 12, at 245.
296. Id. art. 6, at 244.
297. See Third Decree for the Implementation of the Law for the Prevention
of Progeny With Hereditary Diseases, Feb. 25, 1935, in JUSTICE CASE Docs.,
supra note 65, art. 4, at 246.
298. See Law of July 4, 1933, for the Prevention of Progeny With Hereditary
Diseases, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, art. 1, 243. Circular of the Reich
Ministry of Justice to All Presidents of the Courts of Appeal, May 11, 1936,
Announcing Courses for Judges Dealing with Hereditary Disease Cases, in
JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 247.
299. PROCTOR, supra note 1, at 102, 106-08.
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ninety percent of the cases and between 300,000 and 400,000
individuals ultimately were sterilized.300 Roughly three percent
of appeals were successful in reversing decisions. 301  Feeble-
mindedness was the leading basis for sterilization, followed by
schizophrenia, epilepsy and alcoholism.3 2
The sterilization program slowed with the initiation of World
War II; only about five percent of sterilizations were performed
after 1939.303 The program was suspended in November 1944 as
a result of a growing dissatisfaction with the arbitrary imposition of
the sterilization procedure. °4
D. Other Judicial Tribunals
In order to safeguard national security, courts martial were
established in Reich defense districts adjacent to the front lines.3"5
These courts were provided with broad jurisdiction over crimes
"endangering Germany's fighting power or undermining the
people's fighting strength and will to fight."3" Courts were
comprised of a criminal court judge, a Nazi Party official and an
officer of the armed forces.3" 7 Sentences were limited to acquit-
tal, death or commitment to a regular court.308
The Act for Securing of the Unity of Party and State of
December 1, 1933, provided that members of the Nazi Party
possessed "increased obligations to the Fuhrer, the People, and the
State" and that individuals who failed to fulfill this mandate were
"subject to a special jurisdiction of the Party."3 9  In 1934, the
National Socialist Party established a system of party courts to
sanction violations of discipline and the code of conduct.310 The
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 114.
304. See Decree Signed by Dr. Conti and Defendant Klemm, Nov. 14, 1944,
Temporarily Suspending Activities of Higher Hereditary Health Courts, and Auto-
matically Legalizing Pending Contested Decisions, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra
note 65, at 249.
305. Decree of Feb. 15, 1945, on Civilian Courts Martial Procedure, in JUSTICE
CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 250-51.
306. Id. at 251.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. MCKALE, supra note 1, at 118. See Law of Dec. 1, 1933, Concerning
Special Nazi Party and Storm Troops' (SA) Jurisdiction Over Members of the Nazi
Party, the SA, and Their Subordinate Organizations, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS.,
supra note 65, at 166.
310. See MCKALE, supra note 1, at 118-23.
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courts were authorized to impose punishments ranging from
expulsion to reprimand."a  In accordance with the National
Socialist's rejection of legal methodology, most of the judges were
party professionals rather than trained lawyers.312
The party courts enabled Nazi leaders to cloak the conduct of
party members behind a curtain of secrecy and extended National
Socialist surveillance into the most intimate aspects of the lives of
party members.313 Once expelled from the party, an individual
possessed limited career prospects and was subject to criminal
prosecution.314
The most serious transgressions involved interactions with
Jews.315 In fact, party courts were willing to overlook the murder
of a Jew,3 1 6 but not sharing a drink with a member of this scurri-
lous, semitic clan.317 The killing of Jews typically was justified on
the basis of a defendant's dedication to the National Socialist cause
and commendable hatred of the Jews.
3 18
The Fuhrer also frequently intervened to protect party
luminaries. Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher, for example, was
convicted by a party court of illicitly confiscating Jewish property
and of engaging in sexual immorality.319 Hitler suspended Strei-
cher from his party office, but permitted him to continue publishing
his propaganda sheet.32 °
E. The Eastern Territories
In 1940, a separate system of German courts and law was
introduced into the Incorporated Eastern Territories.321  The
ordinance provided that the instigation or incitement of disobedi-
ence to a decree or order issued by German authorities, or a
conspiracy to commit such an act, was punishable by death or, in
311. Id. at 123.
312. Id. at 79-80, 135, 150-53.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 125-27, 139. The imposition of disciplinary procedures customarily
entailed a loss of party privilege. Id. at 123-24.
315. See MCKALE, supra note 1, at 156-57, 165, 169.
316. Id. at 166-67.
317. Id. at 156-57. The rape of a Jewess was harshly punished as racial pollu-
tion. Id. at 165.
318. Id. at 166-67.
319. Id. at 174-75.
320. MCKALE, supra note 1, at 174-75.
321. See Decree of June 13, 1940, Concerning Organization of Courts in the
Incorporated Eastern Territories, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 607.
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less serious cases, with imprisonment.322 Various German racial
decrees subsequently were extended to the incorporated territo-
ries.121
Justice was to be meted out in an expeditious fashion. The
Special Court in Bromberg, in the first ten months of operation,
sentenced 201 defendants to death, eleven to life imprisonment,
and ninety-three to penal servitude totaling 912 years.3 24
In 1941, the Reich introduced the infamous Decree Against
Poles and Jews which prohibited them from engaging in acts
prejudicial to "the sovereignty of the German Reich or the prestige
of the German people. 3 25 Acts of disobedience or violence were
punished severely,3 26 including any act which deserved punish-
ment "in accordance with the fundamental principles of German
criminal law and in view of the interests of the State in the
Incorporated Eastern Territories. 3 27  The death penalty was to
be applied in those instances prescribed by law and if the defendant
manifested a "particularly base attitude. 3 28
Defendants were only entitled to a trial if the proceedings
were in the public interest.329 Cases carrying a penalty of more
than five years were to be brought before Special Courts.33
Sentences were to be carried out without delay,331 and only the
Public Prosecutor was authorized to appeal.332
322. See Decree of June 6, 1940, on the Introduction of German Penal Law in
the Incorporated Eastern Territories, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, § 10,
at 609.
323. See Decree of May 31, 1941, Concerning the Introduction of the Nuern-
berg Racial Laws in the Incorporated Eastern Territories, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS.,
supra note 65 at 626; Second Executive Decree, May 31, 1941, for the Execution
of the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 627-28.
324. See Letter from Defendant Schlegelberger to Lammers, Apr. 17, 1941,
Concerning "Penal Laws for Poles and Jews in the Incorporated Eastern
Territories," in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 611-12.
325. See Decree of Dec. 4, 1941, Concerning the Administration of Penal
Justice Against Poles and Jews in the Incorporated Eastern Territories, in JUSTICE
CASE DOCS., supra note 65, art. I(1), at 632 [hereinafter Decree Against Poles and
Jews].
326. Id. art. III, at 633.
327. Id. art. II, at 633.
328. Id. art. 111(2).
329. Id. art. IV.
330. Decree Against Poles and Jews, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65,
art. V(2), at 634.
331. Id. art. VI(1).
332. Id. art. VI.
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Poles and Jews were not entitled to challenge a German judge
on account of bias.333 Neither could they be sworn in as wit-
ness334 nor file private suits. 335  Poles and Jews, as a rule, were
prohibited from testifying against Germans. 336 The Reich also
was provided with the discretion to establish civilian court mar-
tials. 337 The Decree Against Poles and Jews was applicable to
Poles and Jews who, on September 1, 1939, were residents of the
former Polish State. The latter provision extended the ordinance
to involuntary Polish workers residing within Germany.
338
An example of the severe sentences imposed under the Decree
Against Poles and Jews was the conviction of two involuntary
Polish workers who had attempted to escape to Switzerland.339
The People's Court determined that they had acted with a
treasonous intent to prejudice the welfare of the Reich by depriving
Germany of their labor.34" Defendant Paul Stefanowicz, des-
cribed as a member of the defiant Polish intelligentsia, was
sentenced to death, while his young and impressionable companion
received eight years in prison.341
In another case, a Nuremberg Special Court imposed the death
penalty on a Polish guest worker, Sofie Kaminska, because she
demanded that her employers compensate her for the costs of
transporting her daughter to Poland.342 A scuffle ensued in which
333. Id. art. VII.
334. Id. art. IX.
335. Decree Against Poles and Jews, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65,
art. XI, at 635.
336. See Letter from the Reich Ministry of Justice, Signed by Freisler, to
Presidents of District Courts of Appeal and Others, Aug. 7, 1942, Concerning
"Poles and Jews in Proceedings Against Germans," in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra
note 65, at 669.
337. See Decree Against Poles and Jews, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note
65, at XIII, 635. For statistics on prosecutions and convictions, see Letter of the
Reich Ministry of Justice to Leading Judges and Prosecutors, Apr. 4, 1944, Trans-
mitting a Report of the Reich Statistical Bureau on "Criminality in the Greater
German Reich in the Year 1942," Exclusive of Cases Handled by the People's
Court, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 667-78, 681, 683-84.
338. Decree Against Poles and Jews, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65,
art. XIV(1), at 635.
339. See Secret Judgement of First Senate of People's Court Concerning Two
Poles, May 21, 1943, and Directive of Ministry of Justice to Defendant Lautz
Concerning the Manner of Carrying Out the Execution of One of the Defendants,
in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 702.
340. Id. at 702-03.
341. Id. at 703.
342. See Opinion and Sentence of the Nuremberg Special Court, With Defen-
dant Oeschey as Presiding Judge, Oct. 29, 1943, by Which Two Foreign Workers
Were Condemned to Death, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 705, 706-
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Kaminska allegedly slapped a neighboring soldier who had arrived
to subdue Kaminska.343 She subsequently seized a hoe in self-
defense and tossed a half-pound rock at the soldier as he departed
on his bicycle.4 Kaminska subsequently resisted arrest by a
police official. 45 The Court concluded that the German territory
and fighting men must be protected against Polish criminal ele-
ments.34 6 The defendant's acts were deemed to be particularly
despicable in that they were directed at security forces and
exploited wartime conditions by taking advantage of the depleted
German police.347 Kaminska's conduct towards the farmer also
indicated her inherently criminal nature,' and helped to con-
vince the Court that she merited a sentence of death. 9
F Night and Fog
In 1941, the Fuhrer initiated a campaign of judicial terror in
the occupied territories. Criminal acts against the occupation forces
were to be punished by the death penalty."5 Individuals only
were to be prosecuted in the occupied territories in those instances
in which it appeared probable that a death sentence could be
carried out expeditiously.35' In other instances, the individuals
were to be removed to Germany to face a secret trial before a
Special or People's Court.352 In a memorandum Field Marshal
Wilhelm Keitel, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,
admonished that the Fuhrer believed that the imposition of a
sentence less than death was an indication of weakness.
353
07, [hereinafter Kaminska Judgment].
343. Id. at 707.
344. Id. The stone was considered equivalent to a "cutting or thrusting weap-
on." Id. at 710.
345. Id. at 710.
346. Id.
347. Kaminska Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 710.
348. Id. at 710.
349. Id. at 712.
350. See Secret Night and Fog Decree of Hitler, Signed by Keitel, Dec. 7, 1941,
Concerning Measures to be Taken Against Persons Offering Resistance to German
Occupation, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, art. I, at 775.
351. Id. art II, at 776.
352. Id.
353. See Keitel Letter of Dec. 12, 1941, Transmitting the First Implementation
Decree to the Night and Fog Decree, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at
777-78.
1998] THE PROSECUTION OF JOSEF ALSTOETTER, ET AL. 379
The location and fate of defendants was to be kept confiden-
tial.3" This was designed to create a sense of uncertainty with
regard to the fate of arrestees in the minds of family, friends and
relatives.3 55 Deportees who were acquitted, whose charges were
quashed, or who had completed their sentence, were to be detained
by the Secret State Police.356 The number of prisoners who
perished in the Night and Fog program is unknown; an April 1944
survey, although incomplete, listed 8639 individuals as having been
deported to Germany.35
7
G. Extra-Judicial Punishment
Judicial procedures ultimately proved to be too deliberate and
demanding. A pervasive policy of "delegalization" of the punish-
ment of Jews, Poles and other asocials was adopted.358 In 1938,
the Reich Ministry of Interior approved a policy of protective
custody for those deemed to endanger national security."' The
State Police were authorized to order the internment of individuals
following their arrest, acquittal or service of a prison sentence.36 °
Protective custody was virtually automatic in the case of Commu-
nists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews, race defilers, traitors and sex
offenders. 361  A directive stipulated that those in protective
custody be confined in concentration camps and put to productive
354. See Instructions of Reich Ministry of Justice to Prosecutors and Judges,
Initialed by Defendants Altstoetter, Mettgenberg, and Von Ammon, Mar. 6, 1943,
Concerning Measures Necessary to Maintain Secrecy of Night and Fog Procedures,
in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 794-97.
355. See Letter from the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office to
Concentration Camp Commanders, Aug. 18, 1942, Transmitting Instructions for
Treatment of Night and Fog Prisoners, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at
787.
356. See Secret Directive of the Reich Ministry of Justice, Jan. 21, 1944,
Ordering Transfer to Gestapo of Night and Fog Prisoners Who Were Acquitted,
Against Whom Proceedings Were Quashed, or Who Had Served Their Sentences,
in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 798, 799.
357. MULLER, supra note 1, at 172.
358. See Extracts from the Regulations of the Reich Ministry of the Interior,
Jan. 25, 1938, Concerning Protective Custody, in JUSTICE CASE DocS., supra note
65, at 318.
359. Id. at 318-19.
360. See Minutes of Defendant Klemm on Conferences of Reich Minister of
Justice With Attorneys General and Presidents of Courts of Appeal Jan. 23-24,
1939, Concerning Protective Custody, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at
323.
361. Id. at 324.
380 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:2
work on behalf of the war effort.362 An unusually large number
of these prisoners were shot while allegedly resisting authority or
attempting to escape.363 Justice Minister Franz Guertner inquired
into the curious circumstances surrounding the death of an alleged
escapee who, the day before his death, was reportedly in a prison
hospital with leg braces.364
The abuse of prisoners was common and well-known within
the Ministry of Justice. The Reich Minister of Justice, Franz
Guertner, wrote a memo, in 1935, protesting the beating of
internees.3 65 He advocated a limitation on corporal punishment
and a prohibition on the infliction of force to extract confes-
sions.366  Guertner also condemned the starvation, torture and
lashing of prisoners and called for the prosecution of the perpetra-
tors of such practices.
3 67
In October 1942, the protective custody program expanded
when the Reich Minister of Justice directed public prosecutors to
transfer asocial prisoners to the Secret Security Police.3 68 This
included Jews, gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians detained under
arrest or protective custody, as well as Poles in protective custody,
and Poles, Czechs and Germans serving penitentiary sentences of
over three years.3 69  Jews and Poles were to be transferred to
concentration camps 370 where, along with other asocials, they
were to be worked to death.371 The Minister of Justice also
362. See Letter from Bouhler, Chief of the Fuehrer's Nazi Party Chancellery,
to Lammers, July 26, 1939, Concerning Hitler's Decision to Place Persons in
Security Detention Under Himmler for Work in Concentration Camps, in JUSTICE
CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 329, 330-31.
363. See, e.g., Draft of a Proposed Letter from Guertner to Himmler, Nov. 30,
1939, Concerning the "Carrying-out of Death Sentences," in JUSTICE CASE DOCS.,
supra note 65, at 333, 334.
364. Id.
365. Letter of Reich Minister of Justice Guertner to Reich Minister of the
Interior Frick, May 14, 1935, Protesting Against the "Mistreatment of Communist
Prisoners by Policemen," in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 314, 316-17.
366. Id. at 316.
367. Id. at 316-17.
368. Directive on Behalf of the Reich Minister of Justice to Public Prosecutors,
Oct. 22, 1942, Concerning the "Transfer of Asocial Prisoners to the Police," in
JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 343-44.
369. Id.
370. See Directive of Apr. 1, 1943, on Behalf of the Reich Minister of Justice
Announcing that Poles and Jews Released from Prisons Pursuant to a Decision of
the Reich Security Main Office, Are to Be Transferred to Concentration Camps,
in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 347, 348.
371. See Memorandum of the Reich Minister of Justice on a Conference With
Himmler, Sept. 18, 1942, Concerning "Special Treatment at the Hands of the
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agreed that in those instances in which he concurred in the
judgment of the Reich Leader SS that a defendant had not received
a sufficiently severe sentence, the individual was to be subjected to
"special treatment at the hands of the police., 372  Germans
serving modest sentences in the penitentiary were to be conscripted
into brigades assigned to the African Theater.37 3
One month later, Justice Minister Otto Thierack turned
criminal proceedings against Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, and
gypsies in the Eastern Territories over to the Reich Leader SS, the
head of the Security Police.374 Thierack explained that the
imposition of severe punishments and prison sentences could only
make a modest contribution to the extermination of these
groups. 375 The best course was to turn individuals over to the
police, "who can then take the necessary measures unhampered by
any legal criminal evidence." '376 The property of Jews was to be
confiscated following their death.37 7
In 1944, Martin Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancellery,
distributed a circular noting that English and American fliers had
been flying at low levels and strafing cities.37 s According to
Bormann, this had resulted in the killing of defenseless civilians,
Police" Where "Judicial Sentences Are Not Severe Enough," the Working of
"Asocial Elements" to Death, and Other Matters, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra
note 65, at 504.
372. Id. at art. 1.
373. See Notes of the Reich Ministry of Justice on a Conference of Oct. 9, 1942,
on Transfer of Convicts and "Asocials" in Various Categories to the Africa
Brigade, Special Commandos in the East, and to Himmler, in JUSTICE CASE
Docs., supra note 65, at 670.
374. Letter from Reich Minister of Justice Thierack to Bormann, Oct. 13, 1942,
Concerning the "Administration of Justice Against Poles, Russians, Jews, and
Gypsies," in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 674-75.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See Thirteenth Regulation Under the Reich Citizenship Law, July 1, 1943,
in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at art. 2, 685. The isolation and
evacuation of Jews and gypsies was sufficiently successful that the circulation of
directives was suspended in 1944. See Circular Letter of Himmler to the Supreme
Reich Authorities, Mar. 10, 1944, Noting that "the Accomplished Evacuation and
Isolation" of Jews and gypsies Had Made Meaningless the Previous Manner of
Publishing Special Directives Concerning Them, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra
note 65, at 713.
378. Secret Circular from Martin Bormann to Nazi Party Leaders, May 30,
1944, Concerning "People's Justice Against Anglo-American Murderers," in
JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 577-78. See Decree of Himmler to All
Higher SS and Police Leaders, Aug. 10, 1943, Concerning "Controversies Between
Citizens and Parachuted English and American Terror Fliers," in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 568.
382 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:2
including women and children.379 In several instances, crew
members had bailed out or had made forced landings and immedi-
ately were lynched by angry citizens.380 Bormann noted that, in
accordance with government policy, that criminal proceedings had
not been brought against those involved.381
VI. National Socialist Jurisprudence
A. Legal Procedure
Hitler, in August 1942, instructed newly-appointed Justice
Minister Otto Thierack to "deviate from any existing law" in order
to "fulfill the tasks of the Greater German Reich. ' ' 3' The
immediate task was to replace the remnants of "individualistic" and
"unGerman" "Roman" law with statutory standards which reflected
the collective "'racial spirit"' of the German people.as The
pejorative "Roman law" was supplanted by the equally elastic
expression "Jewish Law" following the German-Italian alliance.
This new Nazi order was based on legal romanticism rather
than rationality; the emphasis was on results rather reason.
National Socialist legal theology contended that only those of
Aryan blood were capable of comprehending and crafting a judicial
code which was consistent with the commands of the unadulterated
and altruistic Germanic soul.385 Race, rather than territoriality,
defined the scope of legal doctrine and the Reich criminal code was
crafted so as encompass Germans at home as well as abroad.8 6
Legal statutes and judicial judgments under National Socialism
were characterized by ambiguous and awkward language. These
convoluted texts concealed the intent of the Nazi regime, and made
legal doctrine difficult to debate or discuss.8 7 Statutory texts also
employed a substantial amount of superfluous language which
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Hitler Decree, Aug. 20, 1942, Concerning Special Powers Authorizing the
Reich Minister of Justice to Deviate from Any Existing Law in Establishing a
National Socialist Administration of Justice, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note
65, at 207-08.
383. Lowenstein, supra note 29, at 785-86.
384. Id. See generally Arthur Kaufmann, National Socialism and German
Jurisprudence From 1933 to 1945, 9 CARDOzO L. REV. 1629, 1634-35 (1988).
385. Lowenstein, supra note 29, at 786.
386. See Decree of May 6, 1940, on the Extension of the Application of
German Criminal Law, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 195-96.
387. Kaufmann, supra note 384, at 1646.
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served to stigmatize and single out the malign motives of defen-
dants.' s For instance, an individual was subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the People's Court and the death penalty if he "unscrupu-
lously, for his won gain or for other low motives.., smuggles
property abroad ... and thus inflicts serious damage to the
German economy."389
The uncertainty of legal doctrine was exemplified by the so-
called rule by analogy. The criminal code provided that "[i]f an act
deserves punishment according to the sound sentiment of the
people, but is not declared punishable in the law... the prosecu-
tion will examine whether the underlying principle of a penal law
can be applied ... and whether justice can be helped ... by
analogous application of that penal law."39  One commentator
notes that this vested judges with discretion to punish acts which
were not explicitly prohibited within the penal law.39' The
aphorism of "no punishment without a criminal law" thus was
replaced by the principle of "no crime without punishment.
392
This doctrine was utilized in the Special Court's conviction of
Jewish leader Leo Katzenberger for racial pollution in 1942. 39'
Katzenberger was a sixty-eight year old leader in the Berlin Jewish
community who had maintained a long-term paternal relationship
with Irene Seiler, a young married woman.394 The evidence
indicated that the two frequently had greeted one another with
kisses and that Seiler occasionally had sat on Katzenberger's
lap.395 Both contended that these were innocent acts which were
not sexually motivated.3 96 The Special Court, upon a faulty
evidentiary basis, concluded that Katzenberger had engaged in
sexual intercourse with Seiler through the exploitation of wartime
conditions. 39  In order to further justify the imposition of the
388. See Extracts from the Law Against Economic Sabotage, Dec. 1, 1936, in
JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at art. 1(1), 182.
389. Id.
390. Extracts from the Law, June 28, 1935, the Code of Criminal Procedure and
the Judicature Act, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at art. 170a, 177-78.
391. See Roetter, supra note 117, at 531.
392. Id.
393. Opinion and Sentence of the Nurnberg Special Court in the Katzenberger
Case, Mar. 13, 1942, in Which Defendant Rothaug Was Presiding Judge, in
JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 653-54 [hereinafter Katzenberger
Judgment].
394. Id. at 657-58.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 661-63.
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death sentence, the panel applied the rule of analogy and held that
mere "petting" constituted "sexual acts in lieu of actual inter-
course" and was "sufficient to charge him [Katzenberger] with
racial pollution in the full sense of the law.,
398
Uncertainty was further introduced into the law by the
abrogation of judicial precedent. The Reich Supreme Court was
required to interpret the law in light of National Socialist ideology
and legal concepts and was specifically instructed to "deviate" from
any decision which had been issued prior to 1935. 39' This was
intended to encourage the Court to bring the law into conformity
with the principles of the Third Reich.4"
The requirement that courts interpret statutory standards in
accordance with National Socialist ideology introduced additional
imprecision into legal decisions. Professor Artur Kaufmann offered
the example of a wife who conceived a child in an adulterous affair
with a Jew.4 1 He noted that under the National-Socialist statu-
tory canon, the husband would be provided standing to contest the
legitimacy of the child despite the expiration of the statute of
limitations.4"2 Kaufmann explained that the German husband
otherwise would be placed in the unconscionable position of
supporting a half-Jewish child.40 3 Legal predictability was further
compromised by the adoption of retroactive laws and punishments.
It is likely that over one thousand were killed by National Socialist
militia in the purge of the SA-a radical para-military organization
affiliated with the Nazi Party.4" Two days later, Hitler signed the
Law About the Measures Taken in Defense of the State in an
Emergency, on July 3, 1934, which decreed that "'the measures
taken on June 30 and July 1 and 2, for the suppression of treason-
able attacks, were taken legally, in defense of the State in an
emergency."' ' 4  On July 13, 1934, Hitler defiantly declared to the
Reichstag that "'[i]f we are reproached for not leaving matters to
398. Katzenberger Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 660-61.
399. Extracts from the Law, June 28, 1935, the Code of Criminal Procedure and
the Judicature Act, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at sec. II, 177, 178-79.
400. Id. See Opening Statements for the Prosecution, in JUSTICE CASE Docs.,
supra note 65, at 31, 45.
401. Kaufmann, supra note 384, at 1643.
402. Id.
403. Id. Kaufmann argues that National Socialism was decidedly antipositivist.
Id. at 1644-45.
404. See Roetter, supra note 117, at 532. See also Frederick Hoefer, The Nazi
Penal System-I, 35 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 385, 387 (1945).
405. Roetter, supra note 117, at 532. See also Frederick Hoefer, The Nazi
Penal System-I, 35 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 385, 387 (1945).
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be dealt with by the ordinary courts, I can only say this: in that
hour I was responsible for the fate of the German nation, and thus
I was the Supreme Law Lord of the German people.'
40 6
The Nazi regime also adopted two special procedures which
institutionalized double jeopardy and compromised the finality of
verdicts. Under the first procedure the Chief Reich Prosecutor was
authorized to lodge an extraordinary objection within one year of
any final penal sentence.' 7 This declaration was to be based on
"serious misgivings as to the justness of the sentence" in those
instances in which the prosecutor "deems a new trial and decision
in the case necessary., 408
On the basis of an extraordinary objection, the Special Penal
Senate of the Reich Supreme Court was required to try the case
anew.40 9  Extraordinary appeals were lodged on twenty-one
occasions, only one of which-involving a police officer accused of
abusing a detainee-resulted in the reversal of a conviction.40
The punishments meted out by the lower court were slightly
reduced in two cases; substantially increased in four; and prison
sentences were elevated to the death penalty on fourteen occa-
sions.41
1
The Chief Public Prosecutor-in another procedure-was
empowered to file a nullity plea with the Supreme Court within
one year of the final judgment of a "local court, the penal chamber
of [a] district court, or [a] Special Court., 412 This plea was to be
based on an objection that the judgment was "unjust because of an
erroneous application of law on the established facts., 413
The Supreme Court was authorized to decide the case, with or
without trial, or to remand the case for retrial before either the
406. Roetter, supra note 117, at 532. The law of treason was applied retroac-
tively. See Request by Under Secretary Freisler for a "Draft on the Retroactive
Effect of the More Severe National Socialist Regulations" or Treason, May 18,
1942; An Interoffice Memorandum Thereon, and a Circular Letter from Defendant
Schlegelberger to Various Reich Authorities Attaching a Draft of a Proposed Law
and Requesting Approval, in JUSTICE CASE DoCS., supra note 65, at 863, 866.
407. Extract from Law, Sept. 16, 1939, Amending Regulations of General
Criminal Procedure, Military Criminal Procedure, and the Penal Code, in JUSTICE
CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at art. 3(1), 405.
408. Id.
409. Id. at art. 3(2). A sentence initially passed by the People's Court was to
be tried before the Special Senate of the People's Court. Id. at art. 3(3), 406.
410. MULLER, supra note 1, at 129.
411. Id.
412. Decree of Feb. 21, 1940, Concerning the Nullity Plea, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at art. 34, 410.
413. Id.
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court whose sentence was quashed or before any other court.414
In hearing the appeals, the Supreme Court ignored its opportunity
"to give the vague regulations more precise legal contours" and
instead adopted the extreme interpretations of the Special
Courts.415 For example, the Court ruled that the death penalty
was statutorily justified for a broad range of acts, including listening
to a foreign broadcast of classical music,4 16 making an indecent
proposal to a married woman whose husband was in the army,417
leaving the scene of a traffic accident,41 and assaulting another
through kicking or choking.41 9
B. Substantive Law
The civil and criminal codes were supplemented by various
statutes which reflected National Socialism's stress on race, blood
and soil. The liberal notions of equality and individualism were
incompatible with Hitler's racial determinism.4 2 A series of
discriminatory decrees were issued which isolated Jews and
prepared the path for their deportation and extermination.421
The so-called Aryan clause threaded through National-Socialist
legislation. Jews were stripped of citizenship and excluded from all
economic and social privileges and ultimately were deported to
their death.422 The implementation of this system of apartheid
required a complex statutory scheme which regulated the most
intimate aspects of life, including marriage, sexual intercourse, the
employment of domestic labor4" and the required use of semitic
names.
424
The expansive scope of this legal regulation is illustrated by
the investigation of a Jewess for selling her mother's milk to a
414. Id. at art. 35, 410-11.
415. MULLER, supra note 1, at 130.
416. Id. at 133-34.
417. Id. at 133.
418. Id. at 133-34.
419. Id. at 134.
420. See Kaufmann, supra note 384, at 1636-37.
421. Lowenstein, supra note 29, at 796-97.
422. Id.
423. See Law, Sept. 15, 1935, for the Protection of German Blood and Honor,
in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 180-81.
424. See Letter from the Reich Ministry of Justice, Signed by Defendant
Mettgenberg, to the President of the District Court and the Chief Public
Prosecutor in Hamburg, Apr. 1, 1939, Concerning the Redesignation of Jewish
Names In Criminal Proceedings, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 597.
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pediatrician without revealing her racial background.4' The milk
was subsequently fed to Aryan children in a nursing home and the
defendant was investigated for the crime of deception.426 The
memorandum explained that the defendant's milk could not be
regarded as "food for German children. The impudent behavior of
the accused is an insult as well.
4 27
German statutory law extended State regulation into the most
intimate aspects of individuals' lives. The notion of personal
autonomy and freedom was inconsistent with the totalitarian ideal.
For instance, listening to foreign radio broadcasts, or spreading
news from foreign radio stations, which was likely to undermine the
defensive strength of the German people was punishable by hard
labor.4" So-called "political Catholicism" was deemed particul-
arly dangerous.4 29  Catholic Priest Luitpold Schosser was sen-
tenced to fifteen months in prison for making an announcement
about the burial of a Polish man in which he was determined to
have "malevolently criticized" and "debased the dignity of the
German people in a incredible way and ... caused a great number
of fellow Germans to behave in an undignified manner.
4 30
State Prosecutors devoted substantial effort to prosecuting
statements critical of the Reich; by October of 1943 an average of
twenty-five such cases were presented for prosecution each day.
431
As the war progressed, prosecutors began to seek the death penalty
for even innocuous remarks.432  This was encouraged by the
425. Draft of Proposed Memorandum to Hitler from Ministry of Justice, April
1943, Initialed by Defendant Rothenberger and Ministerial Director Vollmer,
Concerning Imminent Prosecution of a Jewess for Selling Her Mother Milk to a
German Pediatrician, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 701-02.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. See Decree, Sept. 1, 1939, Concerning Extraordinary Measures with
Regard to Foreign Radio Broadcasts, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at
185.
429. See Letter from Defendant Schlegelberger to Chief Public Prosecutors and
Senior Public Prosecutors, July 20, 1935, Concerning the "Struggle Against
Political Catholicism," in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 912.
430. Extracts from the Official Files in the Case Against Luitpold Schosser, a
Catholic Priest, Sentenced on Dec. 19, 1942, Under the Law Against Insidious
Attacks on State and Party, by a Special Court Headed by Defendant Rothaug,
in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 913-14.
431. See Extracts from the Situation Report of Defendant Lautz, Chief Public
Prosecutor at the People's Court, to Thierack, Feb. 19, 1944, Concerning the
Undermining of Military Efficiency, in JUSTICE CASE DocS., supra note 65, at
885-86.
432. See Circular Letter from the Reich Ministry of Justice to Leading Judges
and Prosecutors, Feb. 19, 1944, Transmitting Excerpts from Reports of a
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Ministry of Justice's instructions that in cases of "undermining the
morale the consideration of the actual nature of the facts must not
be excessive. In the fifth year of the war every German has to
think about the effect of his remarks to other people." '4 33
Various statutory presumptions were employed to elevate the
seriousness of criminal acts. Polish defendant Stanislaw Bratek
served as an involuntary worker on a German farm in Lower
Silesia.434 Bratek was apprehended while attempting to escape to
Switzerland and was convicted of high treason and sentenced to
death. 35 The People's Court rejected the defendant's explanation
that he had been motivated by economic exigency, pointing to his
adequate salary and general lack of ambition.436  The Court
concluded, without evidentiary support, that this firm and fit young
Pole was intent on joining the Polish legion in Switzerland and
fighting to free the former Polish territory from Germany.37 His
departure also was determined to have resulted in irrevocable
injury to the Reich, which was in need of each and every worker
in order to guarantee a steady agricultural supply.438
The broad scope of the criminal law was accompanied by an
increasingly severe system of punishment. A May 4, 1944, decree
virtually released judges from all restraints in the imposition of
criminal penalties. 439 The law provided that a penalty could be
escalated to hard labor for life or to death "if the regular penalty
limits are an insufficient expiation according to the sound sentiment
of the people."'
One author notes that, between 1934 and 1944, 13,000
individuals were sentenced to death." This included a pianist
who criticized National Socialism, a doctor who privately voiced
doubts concerning Germany's eventual victory, and various
Conference of Justice Officials on Cases of "Undermining" and "Malicious
Political Acts," in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 880, 883.
433. Id.
434. The Bratek Case, Dec. 10, 1942-July 20, 1943. Extracts from the Official
Files, Including Gestapo Report of Dec. 10, 1942; Judgment of the People's Court
After Trial of May 20, 1943; and Note of July 10, 1943 on the Execution of the
Death Sentence, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 867-69.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 869.
437. Id. at 868-70.
438. Id. at 871.
439. See Fifth Decree, May 5, 1944, Amending the Decree Concerning Special
Criminal Law in Time of War and Special Emergency, in JUSTICE CASE Docs.,
supra note 65, at 209.
440. Id.
441. KoCH, supra note 1, at 5.
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individuals who told political jokes.442 A memo from the Presi-
dent of the Court of Appeals in Hamm to the Reich Ministry of
Justice indignantly rebutted Hitler's criticisms of the judiciary,
noting that the sentences meted out in his district always had been
severe and that the number of death sentences had more than
doubled between 1940 and 1942.44' In the first six months of
1942, six death sentences had been imposed for offenses against the
war economy, ten for sexual offenses, eight for crimes of violence
and twenty for theft.""
The criminal justice system was not uniformly harsh. There
was a two-tier scheme of justice which reflected defendants'
political backgrounds." 5  Party members generally received
lenient sentences and benefitted from amnesties, pardons and the
suspension of proceedings." 6 A critical remark, depending upon
the political standing of the accused, might be considered as
meriting either a mild rebuke or the death penalty."7
VII. The Justice Case
A. Jurisdiction
In the Justice case, ten Nazi prosecutors, judges and legal
administrators were convicted by an American tribunal of war
crimes and crimes against humanity.4 8  The defendants were
prosecuted under Control Council Law No. 10, which had been
adopted by Allied Powers in order to provide a uniform basis for
the trial of German war criminals." 9
442. Id. at 5-6.
443. See Report from the President of the Court of Appeal in Hamm, July 7,
1942, Concerning the Alarm Among Judges Caused by Hitler's Reichstag Speech
of Apr. 26, 1942, and Certain Activities of the Gestapo and the Nazi Party Affect-
ing Legal Matters, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 448-49.
444. Id.
445. See Letter from the President of the Berlin Court of Appeal to Defendant
Schlegelberger, Jan. 3, 1942, Commenting Upon "Influence Exerted Upon the
Judges," in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 433-34.
446. See Lowenstein, supra note 29, at 809-10.
447. Opening Statements for the Prosecution, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra
note 65, at 84-85.
448. See Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 954-
55 (1951). The defendants were Franz Schlegelberger, Herbert Klemm, Curt
Rothenberger, Ernst Lautz, Woefgang Mettgenberg, Wilhelm von Ammon,
Guenther Joel, Oswald Rothaug, Rudolf Oeschey and Josef Altstoetter. Id. at
1200. The sentences ranged from five years to life. Id.
449. Id. at 957. The relevant provisions of Control Council Law No. 10 are
quoted at 959-61.
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The Court held that its jurisdiction was based on the Allied
Powers' condominium control over Germany.45  The Reich
regime had unconditionally surrendered and completely col-
lapsed.45' The resulting chaos had compelled France, Great
Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States to intervene in
order to provide political stability, implement socio-economic
reform and punish those responsible for depredations and de-
licts.452 The Tribunal held that, under the circumstances, the
Allies were sovereign rather than occupying powers.453 As a
result, unlike the German occupation of Europe, which was
contested by armies in the field, the Allied Powers were not
constrained by the international legal limitations on occupying
powers.454
The prosecution was an exercise of legal authority by the
Allied Control Council, which had established judicial machinery
to punish war crimes and crimes against humanity. The jurisdic-
tional claim of this international body ordinarily could not have
been successfully asserted absent the consent of the relevant
territorial State.455  However, in this instance, there was no
governing regime. The Court conceded that Germany was not the
only country which had committed war crimes.456 But, it noted
that the prosecution of non-German war criminals was dependent
upon the exercise of jurisdiction by either the offended State, the
perpetrators' State of nationality or a recognized international
authority.457
The Tribunal also held that the substantive provisions of
Control Council Law No. 10 were neither an abuse nor an
unprecedented exercise of authority.458 Control Council Law No.
10 was merely a codification of pre-existing principles of interna-
tional law which had been previously recognized by the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg."9
The failure to codify these doctrines earlier was not control-
ling. International law was an evolving and dynamic set of
450. Id. at 959.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 960.
453. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 959-61.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 970-71.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 966.
459. Id.
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doctrines. The recognition of a principle as part of international
law was dependent upon State practice rather than legislative
enactment. 46W The authoritative acceptance of war crimes and
crimes against humanity was indicated by their incorporation into
the Nuremberg Charter, Control Council Law No. 10 and acknow-
ledgement in United Nations resolutions.461
B. War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
The Tribunal noted that the war crimes provision of Control
Council Law No. 10 closely paralleled the Nuremberg Charter and
encompassed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war
directed against non-German nationals. 462 This was supplemented
by the crimes against humanity provision. 3  The text differed
from the Nuremberg Charter in that it was not limited to acts
undertaken "in execution of, or in connection with, any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."'  In addition, Control
Council Law No. 10, instead of punishing atrocities committed
against "civilians of or in or from occupied territory," prohibited
acts committed against "any civilian population." 465 The Tribu-
460. Id. at 966-68.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 971-72. War Crimes are defined in Control Council Law No. 10 as:
Atrocities or offences against persons or property constituting violations
of the laws or customs of war, including but not limited to, murder, ill
treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose, of
civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages,
or devastation not justified by military necessity.
Id. at 971.
463. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 971.
464. Id. at 974. The Nuremberg Charter defines crimes against humanity as:
Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during
the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Id. at 972.
465. Id. at 972. Control Council Law No. 10 defines crimes against humanity
as:
Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture,
rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the
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nal, in surveying this language, ruled that the crimes against
humanity provision of Control Council Law No. 10 expanded the
Nuremberg standard, as interpreted by the International Military
Tribunal, and encompassed acts committed by the Nazi regime
against German nationals in periods of peace as well as war.'
The concluding clause of the crimes against humanity provi-
sion, under Control Council Law No. 10, provided that acts
constituting crimes against humanity constituted delicts, "whether
or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where
perpetrated. 4 67  This was interpreted by the Tribunal to mean
that compliance with the rules of the Reich did not constitute a
defense, regardless of the nationality of the victim.46 The Tribu-
nal also ruled that the use of the phrase "'civilian population,"'
rather than "'civilian individual,"' limited crimes against humanity
to systematically organized acts conducted by, or with the approval
of, governmental regimes.4 9
The Court speculated that this extension of international
jurisdiction into areas traditionally deemed to be within the
domestic jurisdiction of States was a product of the historic
depredations committed by countries against their own popula-
tions. 47° There was a realization that acts within a single State
posed a threat to the stability of international society.471' Global
public opinion also had come to recognize the moral imperative of
international intervention to protect human rights.472
The defendants were not charged with the commission of
isolated crimes against any single individual.473  Instead the
indictment charged the defendants with involvement in an officially
organized system of "cruelty and injustice, in violation of the laws
of war and of humanity, and perpetrated in the name of law by
the . . . Ministry of Justice, and through the instrumentality of the
courts. The dagger of the assassin was concealed beneath the robe
of the jurist. 474  The Court limited its consideration to acts
country where perpetrated.
Id.
466. Id. at 974, 979.
467. Id. at 972.
468. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 972-73.
469. Id. at 973. See also id. at 982.
470. Id. at 979-82.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 979-82.
473. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOES., supra note 65, at 984.
474. Id. at 985.
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committed subsequent to the outbreak of World War 11.
415
However, it noted that acts undertaken prior to that time to
transform the judicial system into an instrumentality for the
propagation of Nazi ideology, the extermination of opposition, and
the advancement of plans for aggressive war, were relevant to the
defendants' knowledge, intent and motivation.476
C. Legal Defenses
The Tribunal rejected the claim that Control Council Law No.
10 constituted retroactive punishment, ruling that this doctrine
neither constituted a legal nor moral barrier to prosecution under
international law.4" The application of the prohibition on ex post
facto punishment to an area as diverse and fluid as international
law would frustrate transnational prosecutions. 478  At any rate,
the defendants were well aware that many of their acts violated the
pre-existing provisions of the German domestic criminal code.479
The Allied Powers also repeatedly warned that their intent was to
bring the perpetrators of Nazi atrocities to the international bar of
justice.48 ° Thus, "[w]hether the crime against humanity is the
product of statute or of common international law, or ... of both,
we find no injustice to persons tried for such crimes. They are
chargeable with knowledge that such acts were wrong and were
punishable when committed. 4 81
The Tribunal also rejected the applicability of the superior
orders defense, pointing to the preclusion of the domestic law
defense in the provision on crimes against humanity.482  Control
Council Law No. 10 also provided that "'the fact that any person
475. Id.
476. Id. at 985, 988.
477. Id. at 974-75.
478. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 974-75.
479. Id. at 975-76.
480. Id. at 974-75, 977-78. The prohibition against retroactive punishment
requires proof that the accused should have known that:
in matters of international concern he was guilty of participation in
a nationally organized system of injustice and persecution shocking
to the moral sense of mankind, and that he knew or should have
known that he would be subject to punishment if caught .... [N]o
person who knowingly committed the acts made punishable by C.C.
10 can assert that he did not know that he would be brought to
account for his acts.
Id. at 977-78.
481. Id. at 983.
482. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of a superior
does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be
considered in mitigation.' 483 The Tribunal conceded the validity
of the defendants' contention that they had been required to follow
Hitler's dictates, regardless of whether these decrees contravened
international law.484 However, the Court countered that it would
be illogical to rule that the very governmental involvement which
elevated the defendant's acts to international concern could be
invoked as a defense.485 The core of the prosecution's case was
that the "[d]raconic, corrupt, and perverted Nazi judicial system
themselves constituted the substance of war crimes and crimes
against humanity and that participation in the enactment and
enforcement of them amounts to complicity in crime. '
The Tribunal also rejected the defense of judicial immunity.
The Court explained that the notion that judges were not person-
ally liable for their actions was based on the conception of an
independent judiciary which autonomously and impartially issued
judicial decisions. 487 Judicial immunity also traditionally had not
extended to malfeasance in office.48
The Court noted that the judicial independence and neutrality
of the German judiciary had been completely destroyed. Legal
decisions were the product of the interplay between the Ministry of
Justice, the Party Chancellery, Gestapo, and judicial bureau-
cracy.489  Only the most ideologically zealous Nazi jurist was
immune from interference. As a result, the American Tribunal
determined that the Nazi courts more closely resembled administra-
tive tribunals, which acted in a quasi-judicial manner in implement-
ing the political directives of the Fuhrer, than independent judicial
institutions. 490
D. The Third Reich: Draconian Decrees
The Tribunal extended substantial deference to German law-
makers. The Court noted that habitual criminals were severely
condemned in various countries, including the United States.
491
483. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 983-84.
484. Id. at 983-84.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 984.
487. Id. at 1024.
488. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1024.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 1013, 1024-25.
491. Id. at 1026.
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The imposition of life imprisonment on such individuals during
peacetime in America could not be condoned while the infliction
of the death penalty in Germany during wartime was con-
demned.49  Capital punishment also appeared justified against
those who exploited wartime conditions to hoard, loot, plunder and
rob.493 Severe restrictions and repression of freedom of speech
in order to maintain social stability during armed conflict also could
not be denounced as a crime against humanity.494
The Tribunal further ruled that the fact that Germany was
waging a war of aggression did not color these statutes with
criminality.95 There was no evidence that those who enforced
the laws were part of a conspiracy to wage an aggressive war or
were aware that Germany was engaging in acts of aggression.496
The adoption of such an expansive theory of culpability also would
contravene basic jurisprudential principles, by resulting in the
imposition of collective as well as strict liability.497 The Court,
however, cautioned that individuals who had enforced these
statutes in a discriminatory fashion or through "arbitrary and brutal
means, shocking to the conscience of mankind" '498 were subject to
sanctions.
The Tribunal was less sympathetic to the Reich's application
of the law of high treason to involuntary Polish workers. The
Court ruled that Germany's annexation of Polish territory while
indigenous armies were in the field contesting the Reich's control
was invalid.499 Although an occupying power may punish local
residents who engage in subversive activities, the invocation of the
term treason did not justify the imposition of punishment for the
exercise of internationally protected activity."° Poles, for exam-
ple, were prosecuted for attempting to escape the Reich to join the
Polish Legion." 1 They were alleged to have been guilty of at-
tempting to detach territory from Germany by violence or threat
of violence." 2 This territory consisted of portions of Poland
492. Id.
493. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1026.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 1026-27.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1026-27.
499. Id. at 1027-28.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id.
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which had been illegally annexed into the Reich." 3 The theory
of the German prosecution, according to the Court, would mean
that every Pole fighting for the lawful restoration of Polish territory
would be guilty of high treason and could be shot on capture."
The Tribunal determined that this application of the law of treason
constituted a war crime and crime against humanity.5 The
problem "was not merely in misnaming the offense of attempting
to escape from the Reich; the wrong was in falsely naming the act
high treason and thereby invoking the death penalty for a minor
offense."5 0
6
The Tribunal also ruled that those defendants involved in the
Night and Fog program were aware that the policy contravened
international law. 507  Deportees were not provided with the
requisites of a fair trial.50 8 They often were interned under
inhumane conditions 0 9 and compelled to work in the armaments
industry.510 The program was suspended in 1944 and the Night
and Fog prisoners were turned over to the Gestapo. 511 This was
a clear violation of Control Council Law No. 10, which provided
that the deportation of individuals for slave labor, or for any other
purpose, constituted a war crime.512
The Night and Fog program also contravened the international
law of belligerent occupation. The latter, as well as Control
Council Law No. 10, prohibited the torture of civilians by occupy-
ing forces. 513  Those secretly transported to Germany were
imprisoned under inhumane conditions, ill-treated and starved." 4
The Tribunal thus concluded that the Night and Fog tribunals had
cooperated in enforcing this callous and cruel policy and were
complicit in outrages against human rights and international
law.515
503. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1027-28.
504. Id. at 1028.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 1038.
508. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1046.
509. Id. at 1044.
510. Id. at 1054-55.
511. Id. at 1055.
512. Id. at 1059.
513. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1061.
514. Id.
515. Id. at 1060-1062. See also Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND WORLD ORDER 129 (Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk & Anthony
D'Amato eds., 2nd ed. 1990).
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E. The Third Reich: Discriminatory Decrees
Legal officials also participated in a plan for the persecution
and extermination of Poles and Jews throughout Europe. The
intent was to eliminate the Poles and Jews through killing or
confinement in concentration camps.516 As a prelude to this
scheme, Jews were deprived of all civil and political rights and
socio-economic privileges.517 The defendants were found to have
enacted, enforced and judicially applied these laws which "formed
the subject matter of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 518
The Tribunal observed that the part played by the legal system
in the extermination of Poles and Jews was modest as compared to
the mass extermination of millions by the Security Police and
Gestapo.519 Courts nevertheless substantially contributed to the
"Final Solution."52  In 1942 alone, over 61,500 persons were
convicted under the Law Against Poles and Jews. 521
The defendants avowed that they had been unaware of the
activities of the Gestapo in the concentration camps and therefore
lacked criminal intent.522 The Tribunal, however, determined that
it would have been impossible for anyone integrally involved in the
justice system to have been uninformed of the treatment meted out
to internees. 523  The defendants' profession of ignorance also
contradicted their claim that they had remained in office in order
to control the conduct of the Gestapo.524
At the very least, the Court pointed out that the defendants
must have been apprised of decrees in official publications
concerning the police punishment of Jews in Germany, Bohemia,
and Moravia, the confiscation of Jewish property, and the Law
Against Poles and Jews.5 25 They certainly were exposed to party
publications, listened to the radio, conversed with their colleagues,
516. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1063.
517. Id. at 1063-64.
518. Id. at 1063.
519. Id. at 1078-79.
520. Id. at 1079.
521. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1079.
522. Id. at 1079.
523. Id. at 1079.
524. Id. at 1080.
525. Id. at 1080-81.
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heard and delivered lectures, and were aware of the broad outlines
and scope of the Reich's plan of racial persecution."
The Tribunal concluded that the defendants involvement in the
Reich's plan of racial persecution, when carried out in the occupied
territories, comprised war crimes and crimes against humanity;
when carried out in the Reich against German nationals, this
persecution amounted to crimes against humanity. 27
VIII. The Justice Case Defendants: The Evil of Good Intentions
A. Franz Schlegelberger: Factual Allegations
Justice Minister Franz Schlegelberger offered the classic
defense of the man in the middle; he claimed that he cooperated
with the Reich regime and remained in office in order to prevent
the ascendancy of lawless forces who aspired to abrogate the rule
of law.5 28 In fact, following Schlegelberger's removal and replace-
ment by Otto Thierack, the Chief Judge of the People's Court, the
police assumed jurisdiction over the disposition of Jews and other
groups, resulting in the summary extermination of hundreds of
thousands.5 29 The Schlegelberger case starkly raises the issue of
the responsibility of a lawyer in a repressive regime. Is the lawyer's
first obligation patriotism or principle? What of Schlegelberger's
claim that his complicity with National Socialism was necessary in
order to preserve the legal process? At what point did the
resulting harm outweigh the potential benefits?
Schlegelberger received his law degree from the University of
Leipzig in 1899 and immediately entered the public service.53° He
was named an assistant judge in the local court at Koenigsberg and
within fifteen years was appointed Councillor of the Berlin Court
Appeals.531 Schlegelberger eventually was elevated to the Minis-
try of Justice and, in 1941, was appointed Under Secretary of State
in charge of civil law under Minister Franz Guertner.53 2  He
retained this title even after Hitler chose him to succeed Guertner
526. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 1081.
"This Tribunal is not so gullible as to believe these defendants so stupid that they
did not know what was going on. One man can keep a secret, two men may, but
thousands, never." Id. at 1081.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 1086.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 1081.
531. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1081.
532. Id. at 1081-82.
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upon the latter's death in January 1941. 5"3 Schlegelberger held
this post until August 20, 1942."3 He also harbored intellectual
aspirations: publishing, teaching and lecturing at home and abroad
on commercial, comparative and family law.535 Schlegelberger
testified that he was devoted to the impartial and practical
administration of justice and deliberately avoided affiliation with a
political party.5 36 He described himself as a progressive conserva-
tive537 and, in 1933, refused an invitation to join the National
Socialist Party.538 However, Schlegelberger testified that he had
no alternative other than to acquiesce in Hitler's order in 1938 to
join the Nazi Party.539 He stated that he nevertheless avoided
involvement in Party affairs and did not favor party members in
personnel decisions.'
Schlegelberger professed disgust and shame over the National
Socialists' anti-semitic policies.541 He testified that he had saved
his best friend, a Jewish judge, from extermination and that his
physician was half-Jewish. 42 Schlegelberger, however, recognized
that the Nazi's were determined racists and that the best he could
hope for was to moderate the Fuhrer's anti-semitic initiatives.43
Hitler reportedly viewed Schlegelberger as an experienced civil
servant who was suited to serve as interim Justice Minister.5 "
However, the Fuhrer remained distrustful of Schlegelberger and
displayed a distant and dour demeanor towards his Justice
Minister.545 Schlegelberger testified that he was not intimidated
by Hitler and contemptuously viewed the Fuhrer as an avowed
enemy of the rule of law."l He claimed that he openly disputed
533. Id. at 1082.
534. Id.
535. See Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Schlegelberger, in JUSTICE
CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 284-86 [hereinafter Schlegelberger Testimony I].
536. Id. at 287.
537. Id. at 287.
538. Id. at 288.
539. See Letter from the Chief of the Fuehrer's Nazi Party Chancellery to
Defendant Schlegelberger, Jan. 30, 1938, Stating that Hitler Has Directed that
Schlegelberger be Accorded Membership in the Nazi Party, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 363.
540. Schlegelberger Testimony I, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 288.
541. See Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Schlegelberger, in JUSTICE
CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 717-18 [hereinafter Schlegelberger Testimony II].
542. Id. at 718.
543. Id. at 718.
544. Schlegelberger Testimony I, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 291.
545. Id.
546. Id.
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Hitler's initiatives, explaining that "I was out to fight for justice and
against arbitrariness. 5 47  He claimed that he was subjected to
constant attack and criticism from those party and political factions
who desired to transfer the administration of justice to the police
or who aspired to control appointments to the bench and bar and
to dictate judicial opinions.54s
Schlegelberger learned to proceed with caution. He related
that he had persuaded Hitler to permit Jewish lawyers to continue
to practice.5 49  However, he encountered strong bureaucratic
resistance, was accused of being a Jew, and acquiesced in the
Fuhrer's decision to permit only a limited number of Jewish legal
consultants.55 ° Schlegelberger testified that "I had to content
myself with making a compromise and I had to be pleased when at
least I had achieved some amelioration. To use a customary
phrase, if I had drawn the consequences from every defeat, I would
have deprived myself of all possibility to aid the Jews."55'
Schlegelberger's aspiration was to maintain a measure of
integrity and independence in the judicial process.552  He des-
cribed a series of compromises which he had accepted in an effort
to calm his critics and to prevent the police from asserting
jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions and punishments. 53
Schlegelberger testified that this was his motivation for agreeing to
547. Id.
548. Schlegelberger Testimony I, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 292-
303, 308-09.
549. Schlegelberger Testimony II, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at
718-19.
550. Id. at 719.
551. Id. at 718. Schlegelberger's efforts at compromise are illustrated in his
controversial April 1942 memo advocating the limitation of deportation to full-
blooded Jews. See Letter from Defendant Schlegelberger to Lammers, Mar. 12,
1942, Expressing Concern About Contemplated Anti-Jewish Measures; Reply
from Lammers, Mar. 18, 1942; Letter from Schlegelberger to Seven Government
and Party Agencies on "The Final Solution of the Jewish Problem," Apr. 5, 1942;
File Note on Situation of Berlin Jews, Nov. 21, 1941, in JUSTICE CASE Docs.,
supra note 65, at 647-49. He proposed that descendants of Jewish marriages of the
first degree (two non-Aryan grandparents) should be provided the alternative of
submitting to sterilization. Id. at 648. Schlegelberger would have excluded the
descendants of mixed marries of the second degree (one non-Aryan grandparent)
from deportation. Id. at 649. He opposed the mandatory divorce of mixed-
couples, but argued that the German-blooded partner should be enabled to obtain
an expedited divorce. Id. at 649. Schlegelberger later explained that "[t]here are,
after all, situations where one can only escape a larger evil by applying a smaller
evil." Schlegelberger Testimony II, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 722.
552. Schlegelberger Testimony I, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 290.
553. Id.
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limitations on judicial protections and remedies in the trials of
Jews.5 4 He explained that "again we were faced with a case in
which a concession which in itself was immaterial but which to the
outside world, nevertheless, seemed important, had to be made in
order to pacify party circles." '555
Schlegelberger testified that there had been no alternative
other than to turn internees over to the police for execution." 6
He testified that resistance would have been futile and would have
jeopardized the entire administration of justice. 7 Those who
refused to cooperate would have been labelled as saboteurs,
terminated, interned, and replaced by individuals willing to serve
the State.5 Schlegelberger also explained that he had helped
draft the Night and Fog Decree in order to avoid condemning
internees to the exclusive custody of the police.559
Schlegelberger, at times, dangerously compromised principle.
In March 1942, he wrote the Fuhrer promising to educate judges
into "a correct way of thinking, conscious of the national dest-
iny."" 6  He urged Hitler to inform him of any verdicts which
failed to meet the Fuhrer's approval.61  Schlegelberger later
rationalized that he had hoped that Hitler's involvement would
insulate the judicial process from criticism by party and political
activists who wished to weaken the administration of justice.561
Schlegelberger continued to acquiesce in Hitler's dictates. In
1941, he complied with the Fuhrer's demand that Mark Luftgas,
imprisoned for thirty months for hoarding eggs, should be execut-
ed.563  Schlegelberger later urged judges to adhere to Hitler's
554. Schlegelberger Testimony II, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at
723.
555. Id. at 724.
556. See Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Schlegelberger Concerning
Transfers of Persons to the Police, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 349-
51 [hereinafter Schlegelberger Testimony III].
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. See Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Schlegelberger, in JUSTICE
CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 808, 811 [hereinafter Schlegelberger Testimony IV].
560. Letters from Defendant Schlegelberger to Hitler and Lammers, March
1941, and March 1942, Concerning Judicial Sentences Displeasing Hitler and
Proposing Participation in Civil Proceedings by Public Prosecutors, in JUSTICE
CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 417.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 418 (letter of Mar. 10, 1941, to Hans Lammers).
563. See Correspondence Between Lammers, Schaub, and Defendant Schlegel-
berger, October 1941, Concerning Transfer of Markus Luftgas to the Gestapo for
Execution, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 429, 431.
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admonition that defendants charged with criminally disturbing the
homefront should be sentenced to death.5" He subsequently
wrote the judges in the Eastern Territories that Poles were
receiving "insufficient prison sentences" which "reveal an incom-
prehensively lenient attitude toward the Polish nation which
confronts us with implacable enmity. . . and justify the reproach
that the administration of criminal law has not proved adequate to
the necessities of war.,
565
In defense of his conduct, Schlegelberger pointed out that
following the appointment of Otto Thierack as Justice Minister, the
Secret Police virtually had usurped the function of the judic-
iary." He testified that he felt that this vindicated his decision
to "fight until the very limit" in order to contain the onset of this
"chaos., 567 Schlegelberger somewhat melodramatically described
himself as having been an island in the National Socialist storm.
He stated that he had attempted to strike a delicate bal-
ance-refraining from opposition to those initiatives which were
inevitable while making an effort to amend those which remained
open to negotiation.569
Schlegelberger was dismissed, in August 1942, when he wrote
the Fuhrer that judges had been disturbed by the Fuhrer's speech
to the Reichstag. 570 He reportedly lectured Hitler on the need
for an independent judiciary which could command popular
respect. 71 Schlegelberger stated that he chose to retire rather
than work under Otto Thierack or accept a judicial post.5 72 Hitler
could not abide this criticism, but expressed his appreciation by
giving Schlegelberger 100,000 Reichmarks and special permission
to purchase agricultural land.5 73
564. Circular Letter from Defendant Schlegelberger to Presidents of District
Courts of Appeal, Dec. 15, 1941, Quoting from a Speech by Hitler and Stating that
Judges and Public Prosecutors Must Keep Hitler's Words in Mind, in JUSTICE
CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 432.
565. Circular Letter from Defendant Schlegelberger to the Presidents of the
Courts of Appeal and Attorneys General, July 24, 1941, Entitled "Mild Sentences
Against Poles," in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 628-29.
566. Schlegelberger Testimony I, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 302-
03.
567. Id. at 303.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 303-04.
570. Id. at 304-05.
571. Schlegelberger Testimony I, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 306.
572. Id. at 305-06.
573. Id. See Report from the President of the Court of Appeal in Hamm, July
7, 1942, Concerning the Alarm Among Judges Caused by Hitler's Reichstag
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In his closing statement, Schlegelberger denied that his conduct
was criminal. He expressed bitterness that his "hard struggle for
justice" was being "rewarded" by "shame and misery., 574 Schleg-
elberger rationalized that it had been impossible for him to resign
from the Justice Ministry and that he had attempted to make the
most of his position by endeavoring to serve the cause of jus-
tice.575 He explained that a direct attack on National Socialism
would have placed him in "daily danger" and would have resulted
in the "opposite of what I wanted to achieve, that is an increase of
the opposition against reasonableness.
576
B. Judgment: Franz Schlegelberger
The Justice Tribunal convicted and sentenced Schlegelberger
to life imprisonment.5 77  The Tribunal observed that Hitler's
conveyance of 100,000 Reichmarks and authorization to purchase
a farm was the Fuhrer's reward for "good and faithful service
rendered in the performance of ... which Schlegelberger commit-
ted both war crimes and crimes against humanity as charged in the
indictment. ,578
Schlegelberger acted as one of the chief public proponents of
National Socialism's perversion of the judicial process. In a speech
in 1936, he introduced and endorsed judicial decision-making
through analogy and the punishment of acts which were contrary
to the sound sentiments of the people.5 79 The Justice Tribunal
noted that these elastic concepts placed individuals at the mercy of
the whim and caprice of judges and created an atmosphere of
insecurity and fear.5"
The Court noted that despite Schlegelberger's avowed concern
for judicial impartiality and independence he had signed the Night
and Fog Decree.58' This single stroke of the pen involved the
Speech of Apr. 26, 1942, and Certain Activities of the Gestapo and the Nazi Party
Affecting Legal Matters, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 448.
574. Final Statements of the Defendants, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note
65, at 941.
575. Schlegelberger Testimony II, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at
718-19.
576. Schlegelberger Testimony I, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 289.
577. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1200.
578. Id. at 1082.
579. Id.
580. Id. at 1082-83.
581. Id. at 1083.
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judiciary in the secret prosecution and disposition of individuals
who had been illegally deported to the Reich. s2
The Tribunal also observed that although Schlegelberger had
opposed party and political intervention into the legal process, he
personally had ordered the execution of Markus Luftgas and had
assured Hitler that he would take action to alter other objection-
able sentences."8 3 In another act of deference, Schlegelberger
responded to a request by Heinrich Himmler and quashed the
conviction of police officer Wilhelm Klinzmann who was charged
with beating a detainee." He later pardoned Klinzmann and
rationalized that this was an opportunity to express the commun-
ity's gratitude and restore the sense of satisfaction associated with
public service.585
The Justice Court also observed that Schlegelberger had
instituted and supported the wholesale persecution of Jews and
Poles.5" It noted that while he may have been "less brutal" than
others that he "can scarcely be called humane. '"" He acquiesced
in the deportation of Jews to the East and only objected that half-
Jews should be provided with the option of deportation or
sterilization.5" Schlegelberger also was responsible for drafting
the Law Against Poles and Jews of December 4, 1941.589 This led
to his complicity in the persecution of Poles and Jews at home and
abroad and extended German law into the occupied territories in
violation of the laws and customs of war.5
Schlegelberger offered a novel necessity defense. He argued
that the legal system was under continual attack from Himmler and
other extremists.591 Schlegelberger claimed that he had remained
in office in order to combat his critics and that his resignation
would have resulted in an even more repressive regime.592 In
fact, following Schlegelberger's resignation, Otto Thierack turned
582. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1083.
583. Id. at 1085.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 1085-86.
586. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1083.
587. Id. at 1083.
588. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1083-84.
589. Id. at 1084-85.
590. Id. at 1083-85. In January 1942, he issued a decree giving the Law Against
Poles and Jews retroactive effect. Id. at 1085.
591. ld. at 1086.
592. Id.
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the administration of justice over to the police which resulted in the
murder of thousands of Jews and political prisoners.
593
But did this justify Schlegelberger's complicity in the extermi-
nation of Jews and Poles and the intimidation of the inhabitants of
the occupied territories? Did the costs outweigh the benefits? The
Tribunal conceded that the Reich's program of "racial extermina-
tion under the guise of law" did not equal the enormity of the
murders attributed to the Security Police.594 The Court neverthe-
less concluded that this offered "cold comfort to the survivors of
the 'judicial' process and constitutes a poor excuse ... [t]he
prostitution of a judicial system for the accomplishment of criminal
ends involves an element of evil to the State which is not found in
frank atrocities which do not sully judicial robes., 595
In summary, the Tribunal concluded that Schlegelberger had
contributed to the very evil which he purportedly had desired to
prevent. The degeneration of the legal system and the undermin-
ing of the rule of law paved the path for the police to exterminate
thousands. After all, "[i]f the judiciary could slay their thousands
why couldn't the police slay their tens of thousands?" '596 Schlegel-
berger, in the view of the Tribunal, was a tragic figure.5 97 He
loved the life of the law and the mind and doubtlessly was pained
over the policies which he felt forced to pursue.598 Yet, "he sold
that intellect and that scholarship to Hitler for a mess of political
pottage and for the vain hope of personal security.'' 599
C. Curt Rothenberger: Factual Allegations
Curt Rothenberger joined the National Socialist Party in May
1933 and was animated by a full commitment to the Nazi cause.'
He slowly progressed through the bureaucracy of the National
Socialist Jurist's League to President of the District Court of
Appeals in Hamburg. 6°1 Rothenberger, in 1942, was appointed
Under Secretary in the Ministry of Justice under Otto Thierack and
left the post one year later.' He served as a member of the
593. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1086.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. Id. at 1087.
598. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DocS., supra note 65, at 1087.
599. Id.
600. Id. at 1107.
601. Id.
602. Id.
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Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party throughout his career. 6°3
Rothenberger was a proponent of an impartial and indepen-
dent judiciary' and complained to Schlegelberger that the
attacks on jurists were having "a disastrous effect on the morale of
the judges." 5 In an effort to gain Hitler's support for an auton-
omous judiciary, he penned a paper in which he urged the Fuhrer
to radically revise the legal system to comport with National
Socialist ideology. 6
Rothenberger could not avoid the taint of Nazi criminality.
Despite his protestations that he merely favored limiting the social
and cultural role of Jews, Rothenberger stood silent when confront-
ed with severe anti-semitic measures.' ° He initialed a memoran-
dum to the Fuhrer proposing to prosecute a Jewish woman for
deception who had sold her milk to a nursing home for chil-
dren.608
Rothenberger continuously criticized courts which authorized
Jews to proceed in forma pauperis.609 The Ministry of Justice
subsequently issued a decree, in March 1942, which limited the
authority of Jews to proceed under the poor law to cases in the
social interest, such as litigation over family rights and prop-
erty.610 Rothenberger immediately intervened in a proceeding to
enforce this prohibition.61 ' He later justified his efforts on the
grounds that he desired to prevent the advancing of court costs to
603. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 1107.
604. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying texts.
605. Report from Defendant Rothenberger to Defendant Schlegelberger, July
4, 1941, Concerning Criticism of Judges by the SS Periodical, the Draft Law on
"Asocials," and the Lack of Suitable Candidates for Judgeships, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 446-47.
606. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
607. Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Rothenberger, in JUSTICE CASE
Docs., supra note 65, at 754-55.
608. See supra note 431 and accompanying text.
609. See Undated Report from the District Court in Hamburg Concerning
Granting of Benefits for Destitute Persons to a Jew, Together with Two Letters
of Defendant Rothenberger and an Interoffice Memorandum, Feb. 13-May 22,
1942, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 643. In this memo concerning a
pending civil case, Rothenberger quoted a comment by a party economic official
urging the presiding judge to adhere to National Socialist ideology rather than
legal principle. The economic adviser noted that a decision in favor of a Jew
would be contrary to the "sound sentiments of the people." Id. at 644.
610. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1113.
611. Id. at 1114.
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Jews who had sheltered their assets by executing a pretextual
transfer of their property abroad.612
In response to various complaints from judges, Rothenberger
visited Mauthausen concentration camp in the company of Ernst
Kaltenbrunner, who later was appointed head of the Security
Police.613 Upon viewing the camp, Rothenberger "stated that he
did not observe and could not discover any abuse at Mauthaus-
en. '61 4 Rothenberger testified that he had realized too late that
Hitler was a tyrant and that judicial reform was bound to fail.61 5
He pled that he had been placed in an untenable position in which
his actions were in opposition to his aspirations and attitudes.61
6
Rothenberger claimed to have openly opposed the transfer of
prisoners to the police as destructive of the integrity of the judicial
process and the stability of the State.6 17 He also purportedly
protested to Himmler that the deployment of prisoners in the war
effort was the prerogative of the Ministry of Justice rather than the
Security Police.618 His memo on judicial autonomy further
contributed to his being perceived as an impediment by impetuous
factions within the Nazi Party.619
Rothenberger testified that his passion was the protection of
legal principle rather than personal ambition and that he had
turned down promotion to a series of prestigious positions.62
Rothenberger claimed to have used his position to parry attacks
against the administration of justice.621 For instance, he noted
that he had urged the Security Police to use informers whom he
knew would safeguard the judicial system. 62
Justice Minister Otto Thierack initially considered appointing
Rothenberger to a position on the Reich Supreme Court.6'
612. Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Rothenberger, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 754, 757-58.
613. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1114.
614. Id. at 1115.
615. See Final Statements of the Defendants, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra
note 65, at 943-45.
616. Id. at 944.
617. See Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Rothenberger, in JUSTICE
CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 511, 513, 517-23.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Rothenberger, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 387.
621. Id. at 387-91.
622. Id.
623. Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Rothenberger, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 520-21.
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However, Thierack reportedly became disenchanted with his
subordinate and initiated an investigation into the charge that
Rothenberger illegally had procured office furniture.624 Allega-
tions of plagiarism later also were lodged against Rothenberger.6 25
These allegations were the basis for his dismissal and subsequent
demotion to notary.626 Rothenberger claimed that the underlying
rationale for his termination was that his views had angered Nazi
extremists. 627 He ruefully noted that following his removal "the
road for the wishes of those men [Himmler, Thierack and Bor-
mann], concerning the administration of German justice now lay
open. 13628
D. Judgment: Curt Rothenberger
The Justice Tribunal observed that Rothenberger was "full of
complexities, contradictions, and inner conflict."6 29  He offered
assistance to various half-Jews, 6 ° but also was a central figure in
denying Jews the rights and privileges of legal litigants.631 Rothen-
berger protested against the criticism of the courts, yet attempted
to impose his will on judges and condemned jurists who failed to
afford favorable treatment to party officials. 63 2 He criticized the
callous treatment of inmates in concentration camps, 633 yet
silently witnessed the atrocities at Mauthausen.63 4
The Tribunal also pointed out inconsistencies in Rothen-
berger's purported "opposition" to protective custody. In a 1939
memo, he argued that this practice should be limited to cases of
social protection and should not be utilized to correct court
decisions. 635 However, in 1941, Rothenberger seemingly aban-
doned this position, complaining to the Ministry of Justice that
624. Id.
625. Id.
626. Id.
627. Id. at 520-22.
628. Final Statements of the Defendants, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note
65, at 945.
629. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1107,
1117.
630. Id. at 1117-18.
631. Id.
632. Id. at 1118.
633. Id.
634. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1117.
635. Id. See Extract from a Report on a Feb. 1, 1939, Conference at the
Ministry of Justice Between Defendant Rothenberger and Various Court
Presidents, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 327.
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various minor cases were being brought before the Special Court
which could be better disposed of through protective custody.636
In 1942, he protested that public prosecutors were not recommend-
ing sufficiently lengthy periods of protective custody.637
Rothenberger seemingly subordinated all other concerns to his
goal of reconciling an autonomous judiciary with an authoritarian
State. He viewed the independent jurist as a bulwark against the
abuse of power and economic corruption and as a safeguard of
social stability.63 8  Rothenberger testified that he desired to
develop "an autonomous law" which was "independent of the form
of government and without temporal limitation." '639 His aspiration
was to remove judges from the confines of the civil service and to
insulate them from the maelstrom of competing party and political
influences." His antidote was the establishment of an elite corps
of judges who would "judge like the Fuehrer. '' 64
However, after serving in Berlin for fifteen months, Rothen-
berger reluctantly concluded that the Nazi regime could not
countenance an independent judiciary and a separation of pow-
ers.642 Hitler and his Nazi satraps possessed an innate distrust of
the judicial branch and viewed the legal process as an impedi-
ment."3  Rothenberger's advocacy of a judiciary which would
"judge like the Fuehrer" appears to have had the ironic result of
emboldening Hitler to assert his status as the supreme judge and to
increasingly intervene into judicial affairs.' Rothenberger
portrayed himself as a reformer who had courageously taken the
initiative in attempting to insulate German justice from party and
political influence and interference."4  While Rothenberger
conceded culpability for his own conduct,' he objected to
636. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65 at 1117.
637. Id.
638. See Testimony of Defendant Rothenberger Concerning His Memorandum
on Judicial Reform, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 489, 495, 497, 499.
639. Id. at 491.
640. Id. at 499-500.
641. Id. at 500.
642. Id. at 499-502.
643. Testimony of Defendant Rothenberger Concerning his Memorandum on
Judicial Reform, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 499-502.
644. Id. at 499, 501-02.
645. Final Statements of the Defendants, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note
65, at 943-45.
646. Id.
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accusations that he co-authored memos which called for such
measures as giving the Gestapo authority over Jews.6"7
The Tribunal sympathetically concluded that Rothenberger had
failed to comprehend the brutality of the National Socialist
regime.' He was discharged because he was an anathema to
Nazi zealots who were contemptuous of his unwillingness to fully
cooperate with the regime's cruel and callous policies.649 But, this
did not excuse Rothenberger's crimes. The Tribunal concluded
that Rothenberger had taken a modest but consenting role in the
Night and Fog policy and had aided and abetted the program of
racial persecution.65 Despite his protestations, he also had
assisted in the perversion and subordination of the Ministry of
Justice and the legal system to the dictates of Hitler and his
henchmen.65'
Rothenberger's clearest case of criminality was his participa-
tion in enacting and enforcing the discriminatory law denying Jews
the status of forma pauperis. The Tribunal noted that "he enforced
it when enacted and, in the meantime, before its enactment, upon
his own initiative he acted without authority of any law in denying
to Jewish paupers the aid of the courts., 652 The Court recognized
that Rothenberger's involvement in denying Jews the right to
proceed in civil litigation without the advancement of costs was a
modest matter compared to the extermination of millions.
653
Even so, Rothenberger's participation nevertheless constituted
"part of the government-organized plan for the persecution of the
Jews, not only by murder and imprisonment but by depriving them
of the means of livelihood and of equal rights in the courts of
law. ,654
In the end, Rothenberger was convicted of aiding and abetting
the program of racial persecution and of materially contributing to
the subordination of the Ministry of Justice to the demands of the
Secret Police.655 He was sentenced to seven years in prison.656
647. See Extract from the Testimony of Defendant Rothenberger, in JUSTICE
CASE DoEs., supra note 65, at 519-20.
648. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOcS., supra note 65, at 1118.
649. Id.
650. Id.
651. Id.
652. Id. at 1114.
653. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1114.
654. Id.
655. Id. at 1118. The Tribunal noted that Rothenberger, to some extent, had
been "deceived and abused by his superiors" and that evidence had been "'framed
against him."' Id.
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The most benign interpretation suggests that Rothenberger
subordinated all other considerations to his goal of insulating the
administration of justice from party and political influences. He
envisioned a legal system in which judges would be solely account-
able to the Fuhrer. This would shield jurists from partisan political
attack while encouraging the Fuhrer's confidence and support. His
desire to demonstrate his own credibility and doctrinal purity may
have led to his complicity in the callous and cruel policies of the
Nazi regime.657
Rothenberger naively believed that he could convince Hitler
to reform the judiciary so as to create an elite, independent corps
of National Socialist judges. He viewed the Nazi's reliance upon
violence as a necessary but temporary evil which was required to
seize power and eliminate impediments to progress. 658 However,
he failed to comprehend that the concept of an autonomous and
respected judiciary which transcended partisan politics was
antipodal to Nazi ideology. A large number of National Socialist
politicians and party activists viewed legal procedures as an
obstacle to the achievement of their aspirations. 659 Domestic and
international lawlessness and terror was not an ephemeral strat-
egy-it was a core characteristic of Hitler's ruthless regime."
Rothenberger, in all likelihood, managed to impede the
perversion of justice. He testified that as a jurist he could not
accept the sorry state of judicial affairs. He explained that "as long
as I saw the possibility of influencing him [Hitler], I considered it
my duty to make this attempt; otherwise I would have been a
fool." 1 But, in the end, the Tribunal refused to excuse Rothen-
berger's criminal conduct on the grounds that by remaining in
office he might succeed in rejuvenating the rule of law. 2  The
victims of his policies were not advantaged by the speculative
possibility that Rothenberger might restore an autonomous and
independent judiciary and benefit future generations. The suffering
656. Id. at 1200.
657. See supra notes 607-14 and accompanying text.
658. See supra notes 616-25 and accompanying text.
659. Id.
660. Id.
661. Testimony of Defendant Rothenberger Concerning His Memorandum on
Judicial Reform, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 501. Rothenberger's
memorandum, ironically, may have influenced the Fuhrer's decision to assert his
status as the supreme judge. Id. at 502.
662. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 1117-18.
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of the Nazi's victims was an immediate reality; the reformation of
the legal system a distant dream."
IX. The Justice Case Defendants: The Evil of Bad Intentions
A. Oswald Rothaug: Factual Allegations
Oswald Rothaug pursued the path of a prosecutor following
his admission to practice in 1925.6 4 Rothaug's career prospects
noticeably improved following his enrollment in the National
Socialist Party in 1935665 and he eventually rose to Chief Justice
of the Special Court at Nuremberg.66 6 He then assumed the
position of Public Prosecutor of the Public Prosecution at the
People's Court in Berlin in 1943.667 His major responsibility
involved prosecuting cases involving high treason and the under-
mining of public morale. 668 During his tenure at the Special
Court, he also was a member of the Nazi Party Leadership
Corps. 669  Rothaug believed that the judiciary should serve the
interests of the State and insisted that judges possess the proper
political attitude as well as technical proficiency. 67 ° As Chief
Justice, he regularly consulted with the Security Police and was
awarded the status of a secret "honorary collaborator., 67 1 Ac-
663. Id. at 1117-18. Wolfgang Mettgenberg was an expert on international law
within the Reich Ministry of Justice whose responsibilities included the Night and
Fog program. He defended the policy on the grounds that it was preferable for
prisoners to be disposed of by German courts rather than to be directly handed
over to the Gestapo. This was not considered a defense to participation in the
Night and Fog program. Id. at 1129, 1130-32.
Defendants were held liable for their criminal actions rather than their intent.
Defendant Hermann Cuhorst was Chief Justice of the Special Court at Stuttgart.
Affidavits and testimony affirmed that Cuhorst was a fanatical Nazi and a callous
and cruel judge. The records of the Court were destroyed during the war and the
Tribunal was unable to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the
defendant was guilty of issuing discriminatory judgments and punishments. The
Tribunal noted that it "does not consider itself commissioned to try the conscience
of a man or to condemn a man merely for a course of conduct foreign to its own
conception of the law, it is limited to the evidence before it as to the commission
of certain alleged offenses." Id. at 1158-59.
664. Id. at 1143.
665. Id.
666. Id.
667. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCs., supra note 65, at 1143.
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. See Extracts from the Testimony of Prosecution Witness Friedrich Elkar,
in JUSTICE CASE DOCs., supra note 65, at 367, 383-84.
671. Id. at 375.
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cording to Friedrich Elkar of the Security Police, Rothaug
unapologetically believed that Jews, Poles and political dissidents
should be "wiped out by severe penalties" '672 and that trials
should be used as mechanisms for political education and propa-
ganda.673 He openly campaigned for the adoption of the Law
Against Poles and Jews which merely legitimized his long-standing
practice of severely punishing crimes committed by members of
these groups.
674
Rothaug opened the infamous Katzenberger trial by proclaim-
ing that "'[t]he Jews are our misfortune. It is the fault of the Jews
that this war happened. Those who have contact with the Jews will
perish ... [r]acial defilement is worse than murder, and poisons the
blood for generations. It can only be atoned by exterminating the
offender.' ' '67' Rothaug then proceeded to adopt the remarkable
interpretation that sexual intercourse under the racial defilement
statute encompassed any form of sexual activity with a member of
the opposite sex which served to satisfy the carnal instincts of one
of the parties.676 This permitted Rothaug to rule that Katzen-
berger's paternal affection towards Seiler constituted racial
pollution.677 Rothaug did not rest his decision solely on this
interpretation. He also determined, without evidentiary support,
that Katzenberger had maintained a sexual relationship with Seiler
which had been carried out through the exploitation of wartime
blackout conditions. 678 Rothaug, in sentencing Katzenberger to
death, further demonstrated his anti-semitic animus when he
lectured that "[i]f a Jew commits racial pollution with a German
woman, this amounts to polluting the German race and, by
polluting a German woman, to a grave attack on the purity of
German blood.,
679
Rothaug also presided over the trial of Polish agricultural
worker Jan Lopata who was charged with the sexual molestation of
672. Id. at 371.
673. Id. at 376.
674. Id. at 372.
675. Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Rothaug, in JUSTICE CASE
DoCs., supra note 65, at 747, 750.
676. Katzenberger Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 653,
660-62.
677. Id. 653, 660-62.
678. Id. at 653, 660-62.
679. Id. at 663. Rothenberger testified that the evidence was so clear that the
panel was quickly able to reach a decision. See Extracts from the Testimony of
Defendant Rothaug, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 753-54.
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his German employer and with attempting to escape to Switzer-
land.6' ° The local court sentenced the defendant to two years in
a detention camp. This sentence was subsequently overturned on
a nullity plea by the Reich Supreme Court."
The Lopata case was then reviewed by a Special Court, headed
by Rothaug, which sentenced Lopata to death.82  Rothaug, in
accordance with the suggestion of the Supreme Court, determined
that Lopata intentionally had exploited the lack of available
security personnel during wartime and had undermined the security
and integrity of the German people.83 Rothaug's racism reared
its ugly head in the opinion when he observed that Lopata was a
"definitely degenerate personality who is distinguished by irritabil-
ity and a positive propensity to lying... his inferiority is based on
his character and the reason can obviously be found in his
belonging to the Polish subhuman race."6" Rothaug conceded,
during the Justice trial, that a similar penalty would not have been
imposed on a racial German: "I cannot imagine that possibil-
ity ... because the very elements which are of the greatest
importance could not be applied to a German." 5
Rothaug also was responsible for the conviction and imprison-
ment of Catholic Priest Luitpold Schosser for insidious attacks
against the Third Reich.86 The trial revolved around Schosser's
funeral for a deceased Polish worker as well as a sermon which he
had delivered a year earlier based upon Chapter VII of Mat-
680. See the Lopata Case, April-December 1942, Extracts from the Official
Files Including: Verdict of Local Court Sentencing Lopata, a Pole, to 2 Years'
Imprisonment; Decision of the Reich Supreme Court Granting Nullity Plea Filed
by Chief Reich Prosecutor; Verdict of the Nurnberg Special Court (Defendant
Rothaug Presiding) Sentencing Lopata to Death; Thierack's Refusal to Pardon;
Lopata's Last Petition for Clemency; and the Record of Execution of the Death
Sentence, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 852-54.
681. Id. at 852, 853-54.
682. Id. at 859-60.
683. Id. at 858-59.
684. Id. at 858. Rothaug testified that a considerable number of criminals
inadvertently had been selected to work in Germany and that his remarks were
directed at "subhumanity in Poland" rather than the "subhuman Polish race."
Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Rothaug on the Lopata Case, in
JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 909.
685. Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Rothaug on the Lopata Case,
in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 911.
686. See Extracts from the Official Files in the Case Against Luitpold Schosser,
a Catholic Priest, Sentence on Dec. 19, 1942, Under the Law Against Insidious
Attacks on State and Party, by a Special Court Headed by Defendant Rothaug,
in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 917.
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thew.' This verse admonished the brethren to "'[b]eware of
false prophets' in the "'cloak of lambs"' who "'in their interior are
roaring wolves.'"" Rothaug reportedly engaged in a series of
anti-Catholic diatribes during the trial.69 He later justified
Schosser's conviction on the grounds that people went to church to
hear of spiritual matters rather than politics.69°
In his closing statement at the Justice trial, Rothaug testified
that he had served his nation and that there had been no indication
that the State to which he was so dedicated would one day be
accused of having been a criminal country which had waged a war
of aggression. He noted that his only crime was having assiduously
applied the laws of his country in accordance with the rulings of the
Reich Supreme Court.6 91 The decisions which he issued were
indistinguishable from those of the other Special Courts in the
Reich.6'
Rothaug also attempted to place his actions in the context of
wartime Germany. He noted that national security required the
severe and swift punishment of those who preyed on the popula-
tion.693 Warfare demanded the sacrifice of thousands to save the
lives of millions; the same principle was applicable in the field of
criminal law. In this process, some innocents undoubtedly had
been convicted in the interests of safeguarding German society.
But, Rothaug insisted that he had been unaware of the extermina-
tion of Jews.694 He bemoaned that the defeat and resulting
demonization of the Nazi regime had made it futile to attempt to
explain the humane impulse which had animated many of the
policies of the Reich.695
B. Judgment: Oswald Rothaug
The Justice Tribunal pointed to numerous statements which
indicated Rothaug's support for the Third Reich's racist policies
687. Id. at 919-20.
688. Extracts from the Testimony of Prosecution Witness Father Luitpol
Schosser Concerning His Arrests and Trial, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note
65, at 921.
689. Id. at 923.
690. See Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Rothaug Concerning the
Case of Father Luitpold Schosser, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 938.
691. Final Statements of the Defendants, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note
65, at 947.
692. Id.
693. Id. at 947-48.
694. Id.
695. Id. at 948.
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and knowing participation in the persecution and extermination of
Poles and Jews. 696 Father Luitpold Schosser recounted that
Rothaug jokingly had remarked during his trial that he would
escape from his coffin if he was buried adjacent to a Pole.697
Rothaug went on to note unapologetically that hatefulness was
divinely ordained in the Bible.698
The Tribunal found that this animus was reflected in Rothaug's
judicial opinions. The Court cited a case of two teenaged Polish
women accused of starting a small fire in an armaments plant.699
Rothaug immediately assigned the defendants a defense counsel
and convened his court.7 °0 The two were denied trial under the
Juvenile Act, which was available to German adolescents, and
instead were tried under the Law Against Poles and Jews. 0
Rothaug relied on the young women's confessions-which one of
them recanted in court-to justify imposing a death sentence.7 2
The Justice Tribunal concluded that these young women had been
denied a meaningful trial and had been executed due to their
Polish nationality.7 3 The Court also pointed to the death sen-
tence meted out to Jan Lopata as evidence of Rothaug's discrimin-
atory intent and practice.
The same pattern was evident in the Katzenberger case.
Rothaug instructed a doctor to examine Katzenberger prior to trial,
but cautioned that this was a mere formality since Katzenberger
"'would be beheaded anyhow.',' 75 The doctor's objection that
Katzenberger was elderly and was not capable of race defilement
was met with the retort that "'[i]t is sufficient for me that the swine
said that a German girl had sat upon his lap."'
706
Rothaug interrupted, hectored and encouraged witnesses to
incriminate Katzenberger. °7 During the recess, he directed the
696. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1144-45.
697. Id.
698. Id.
699. Id. at 1147, 1149-50.
700. Id.
701. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1147,
1149-50.
702. Id.
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Id. at 1152.
706. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1152.
See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
707. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1153.
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prosecutor to request a death sentence.7 °8 The Tribunal noted
that Rothaug then proceeded to exaggerate the evidentiary record
in order to reach the desired determination that Seiler and Rothaug
had enjoyed a continuous sexual relationship which had been
carried out through the exploitation of wartime conditions.7"9 In
the end, the Justice Tribunal ruled that Katzenberger's conviction,
and subsequent execution, had been undertaken in furtherance of
the Nazi program to persecute and exterminate Jews; Katzenberger
had been singled out for prosecution for racial pollution precisely
because he was a Jew.710
In sum, the Tribunal determined that Rothaug was a knowing
and willing participant in the Nazi policy of persecuting, torturing
and exterminating Jews, Poles and Catholics.71' The fact that
fewer were exterminated as a result of Rothaug's activities than
died at the hands of others was not deemed to lessen Rothaug's
guilt.712 In fact, the Tribunal noted that his transgressions may
have been more terrible in that he had helped to transform the
courts from an instrument of protection into a mechanism of
persecution.713 The Court concluded that "[i]t is of the essence
of the proof that he identified himself with this national program
[of persecution and extermination] and gave himself utterly to its
accomplishment. He participated in the crime of genocide. 71 4
Rothaug thus stood convicted of having used the law as an
instrument to terrorize and eliminate undesirables. He was
condemned as a "sadistic and evil man" who under a "civilized
judicial system" would have been impeached or criminally convict-
ed on account of the "scheming malevolence with which he
administered injustice. 7 5
C. Judgment. Rudolf Oeschey
Rudolf Oeschey was Rothaug's companion in the crime; they
were the twin terrors of the Special Court. Both were sentenced
to life imprisonment. 716
708. Id.
709. Id.
710. Id. at 1155.
711. Id. at 1155-56.
712. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCs., supra note 65, at 1155-56.
713. Id.
714. Id. at 1156.
715. Id.
716. Id. at 1201.
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Oeschey joined the NSDAP in 1931 and rose through the
judicial ranks to the position of a judge on the Special Court.717
He then succeeded Rothaug, in 1943, as Chief Judge.718 He also
served as Chair of the Civilian Court Martial at Nuremberg during
April 1945.719
Oeschey presided over the prosecution of Sofie Kaminska and
Wasyl Wdowen-both of whom were sentenced to death. °
Kaminksa, as noted, had resisted and subsequently threw a rock at
a German soldier.7 2' Oeschey analogized this to the use of a
"cutting or thrusting weapon" which required the imposition of the
death penalty under the Law Against Poles and Jews.7 2 Oeschey
conceded that the Ukranian Wdowen had used minimal force in
attempting to assist Kaminska.7z  Wdowen nevertheless was
deemed to have knowingly exploited wartime conditions in that he
was aware that the deployment of troops at the front had left the
rural population at the mercy of involuntary workers. 7 4 Oeschey
also concluded that Wdowen had calculated that he likely would
not be imprisoned due to the shortage of available workers.
725
Oeschey, in sentencing both defendants to death, pronounced that
the "German nation which is engaged in a grim defensive struggle
rightly expects the most severe methods to be taken against such
alien elements.,
726
One of the associate judges in the case testified that the
defendants had been "'eliminated in a most objectionable way by
Oeschey for racial and political reasons.' ' ' 727 The other testified
that "Oeschey forced his will upon us" and characterized the
Kaminska case as "'the most terrible of my entire career.'
' 728
The Tribunal concluded that the judgment was illustrative of
Oeschey's knowing and malicious participation in the Reich's
system of racial persecution of Jews, Poles and Slavs.
729
717. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 1159.
718. Id.
719. Id.
720. See Kaminska Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 711-12.
721. Id.
722. Id. at 710. "The over-all behavior of the Polish woman [Kaminska] ...
proves that the crime is not alien to her nature." Id.
723. Id. at 711-12.
724. Id.
725. Kaminska Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 711-12.
726. Id. at 710.
727. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1161.
728. Id.
729. Id.
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In 1945, Oeschey was named presiding judge of a drumhead
court martial established in Nuremberg.73 The Court was direct-
ed to support the embattled German Army by dampening dissent
and crushing crime."' Oeschey managed to convene ten sessions
prior to the American entry into Nuremberg.732 Twelve defen-
dants were disposed of during this period; ten for political offens-
es.
733
The most infamous trial involved the conviction of Count
Montgelas for having expressed his approval of the attempted
assassination of Hitler during a private conversation.73 The
alleged remarks were overheard by an undercover police officer
who had been shadowing Monteglas for several days. 735  The
seriously ill Monteglas was placed in solitary confinement before
being subjected to a secret trial in which he was denied the
assistance of counsel as well as defense witnesses. 736 The entire
process-from indictment through execution-took place within a
three day period.737
The Justice Tribunal noted that the Monteglas' prosecution
had been undertaken within a month of the American entry into
Nuremberg.73s The Court previously had ruled that the prosecu-
tion of individuals for acts and statements inimical to the Third
Reich did not necessarily constitute a crime against humanity.739
However, the circumstances and manner of Monteglas' conviction
convinced the Tribunal that this was a "last vengeful act of political
persecution" which constituted judicial "murder" and a crime
against humanity."
In another instance, a group of foreign juveniles were charged
with having engaged in a minor altercation with members of the
Nuremberg Hitler Youth.74' Oeschey, without evidentiary sup-
port, ruled that the defendants constituted a resistance movement
and sentenced several to death.742
730. Id. at 1162-63.
731. Id. at 1163.
732. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1163.
733. Id. at 1163.
734. Id. at 1163-64.
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1163-64.
738. Id. at 1164.
739. See supra notes 350-53 and accompanying texts.
740. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1164.
741. Id. at 1168.
742. Id.
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The Tribunal observed that these cases were representative of
Oeschey's arbitrary and repressive application of the law. He
regularly berated and insulted defendants and threatened to
exterminate Jews and Poles.7 43 Defense lawyers feared that too
fulsome a defense would result in Oeschey reporting them to the
Gestapo.7" Dr. Hermann Mueller, a prosecutor at the Special
Court in Nuremberg, testified that Oeschey was "'the most brutal
judge that I have ever known ... and a ... willing instrument of
the Nazi terroristic justice."'745
In his closing statement, Oeschey claimed that he had obeyed
and applied the law in a conscientious fashion in accordance with
the legislative intent. He contended that he had afforded each
defendant a fair trial and an equitable verdict and concluded that
"my conscience knows that it is clear of the crimes with which I am
charged."7"
X. The Justice Case Defendants: The Crimes of Conformists
Most of the crimes attributed to judges and lawyers were
committed by bureaucratic conformists who dutifully fulfilled their
responsibilities. These defendants were characterized by a lack of
animation and ardor and mainly were motivated by patriotism and
personal ambition.747
Wilhelm von Ammon had headed the section in the Ministry
of Justice which supervised Night and Fog cases and was charged
with involvement in the systematic abuse of the judicial pro-
cess.748 Von Ammon testified that he occasionally had imple-
mented regulations which he had not personally supported.749
But, he had believed that the outbreak of war was "'to be or not
to be' for Germany" and that he was obligated as a German to
743. Id. at 1165-68.
744. Id.
745. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 1165.
746. Final Statements of the Defendants, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note
65, at 952.
747. See infra notes 748-72. Four defendants were acquitted based on a lack
of available evidence: Paul Barnickel, Senior Public Prosecutor of the People's
Court, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1156; Hermann Cuhorst, Chief
Justice of the Special Court, id. at 1157; Guenther Nebelung, Chief Justice of the
Fourth Senate of the People's Court, id. at 1157; and Hans Petersen, Lay Judge
of the First Senate of the People's Court and of the Special Senate of the People's
court, id. at 1156.
748. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 1132-34.
749. Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Von Ammon, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 815-16.
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"follow instructions issued by my superiors."5 0  Von Ammon
noted that while the Night and Fog regulations were "severe," that
they were "necessary" in order to suppress resistance in the
occupied territories."'
Herbert Klemm's unquestioning support for National Socialism
resulted in his steady ascent from a minor judicial post to the Party
Chancellery and then to State Secretary in the Reich Ministry
under Otto Thierack.752 Klemm was involved in denying Jews,
Poles and gypsies coverage under the German juvenile law;753
participating in drafting the law which extended and retroactively
applied the law against treason to the occupied territories;754 and
was connected with quashing indictments and preventing the
prosecution of civilians involved in the lynch justice of Allied
airmen.755 Klemm also advised his subordinates to execute 800
Jewish, gypsy and Polish inmates interned in Sonnenburg pris-
on.756 In his closing statement, Klemm avowed that he had been
educated and trained in a system in which "obedience to the law
and the norm created by the State has been the only task of the
jurist .... To revoke laws and norms which had existed for years
was not in my competency. 757
Ernst Lautz was Chief Public Prosecutor at the People's Court
in Berlin from September 1939 until the end of World War 11.75
At the height of the Court's activity, he was supervising seventy
prosecutors and was responsible for signing all indictments. 759
Roughly 1500 cases were filed a month under the Law Against
Undermining the Defensive Strength of the Reich of August 1938
alone.7" This law imposed a mandatory death penalty for the
public, attempting to paralyze or undermine the will of the German
people to defend themselves.' The Tribunal determined that
750. Id.
751. Id. at 833. Von Ammon was sentenced to ten years in prison. Opinion
and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1200.
752. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 1087,
1094.
753. Id. at 1093-1107.
754. Id.
755. Id.
756. Id.
757. Final Statements of the Defendants, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note
65, at 943. Klemm was sentenced to life imprisonment. Opinion and Judgment,
in JUSTICE CASE DOCs., supra note 65, at 1200.
758. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1118-20.
759. Id.
760. Id.
761. Id.
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Lautz possessed the discretion whether to prosecute individuals
under the latter statute or under the Malicious Acts Law of
December 20, 1944, which carried a modest prison term.7 62 Lautz
expressed regret that "'many people who were otherwise all right
had to lose their lives.' 7 63 But, he rationalized that the prosecu-
tion and imposition of harsh penalties for treason was "'a good
thing'' since .'no one . . . can claim that this war was lost only
through treason."''
Lautz also was involved in roughly two hundred secret Night
and Fog cases and prosecuted between 150 and 200 involuntary
workers for treason for having attempted to cross into Switzer-
land.765  In addition, Lautz brought prosecutions against Poles
who, prior to the war, had taken action against ethnic Germans for
having engaged in subversion against the Polish State.7" Lautz
recognized that these Poles had acted in accordance with domestic
law and were only subject to the sovereign jurisdiction of the Polish
State.7 67  He nevertheless charged them with acts which were
contrary to the "'sound sentiment' of the German people.768
The Tribunal ruled that these trials violated "justice and fair play"
and constituted a "monument to Nazi arrogance and criminal-
ity.'
769
Lautz's activities against Poles and Jews were determined to be
part of a governmental plan for the extermination of these races;
he was "an accessory to, and took a consenting part in, the crime
of genocide., 7" The Justice Tribunal observed that although
Lautz was not a Nazi zealot, he had believed that he was legally
required to conform to the dictates of Adolf Hitler and to relent-
lessly implement the policies of the Third Reich.7  The Tribunal,
in conclusion, noted that "it may be said in his favor that if
German law were a defense, which it is not, many of his acts would
be excusable., 772
762. Id.
763. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1119-20.
764. Id. at 1119.
765. Id. at 1120-23.
766. Id. at 1127.
767. Id.
768. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1127.
769. Id.
770. Id. at 1128.
771. Id.
772. Id. Lautz was sentenced to ten years in prison. Id. at 1200.
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Von Ammon, Klemm and Lautz all were deeply involved in
the racial persecution of Jews, Poles, gypsies and other groups.773
They were not Nazi zealots, but believed they were obligated to
carry out the commands of the National Socialist State. These
three defendants displayed a lack of conscience and concern for the
consequences of their actions. This moral malleability marks them
as, perhaps, the most psychologically puzzling of all the defen-
dants.'
XI. Lawyers, Law and Justice in the Third Reich
A. The Guilt of the Legal Profession
Prosecutor Telford Taylor, in his opening remarks at the
Justice trial, condemned the defendants for having transformed the
legal system-a traditional safe haven for the oppressed-into an
instrument of political and racial persecution.775 Extermination
and repression were directed against domestic and foreign popula-
tions under the guise of the rule of law. Lawyers and judges thus
aligned themselves and stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the police
and the military in annihilating Jews, Poles, gypsies and political
dissidents. Taylor noted the irony of the Allied Powers providing
the defendants with a fair and impartial trial-a privilege which
they had denied to their victims.776
Many of the defendants in the Justice case, unlike other high-
level Nazi policy-makers, directly confronted their victims. As
773. See supra notes 746, 763, 765-68 and accompanying text.
774. See supra note 757 and accompanying text. Guenther Joel was a fourth
defendant who was convicted and might be included in this group. Guenther Joel
joined the National Socialist Party in 1933 and entered the Ministry of Justice as
a junior public prosecutor. Joel rose through the party and political ranks and
served as the liaison officer between the Ministry of Justice and Security Services.
In 1943, he was named Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals in Hamm and
supervised the prosecution of more Night and Fog cases than the combined total
of all other German courts. Joel eagerly expedited and sought additional cases
and was personally responsible for transferring individuals who were not guilty of
any crime or who had completed their sentence to the Gestapo. The fact that he
supervised rather than actually prosecuted the cases was not deemed a defense.
Id. at 1134-40. At the same time, he was personally involved in insuring that party
members were free from prosecution or only received lenient sentences. In one
instance, he intervened to seek a pardon for two "'deserving National Socialists"'
who had been charged with the malicious shooting of two Polish priests. Id. at
1139.
775. Opening Statement for the Prosecution, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra
note 65, at 31-33.
776. Id.
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judges, they lectured defendants on the merits of National
Socialism and were involved in imposing punitive penalties for
seemingly innocent acts. At the same time, they excused the
excesses of Nazi loyalists and implemented a system of judicial
extermination.77 7
The judges on the People's Court seemed to harbor few doubts
when they imposed a death sentence on sixteen year old Helmuth
Gunther Hubener for listening to English shortwave radio broad-
casts which he then transposed into anti-Nazi leaflets. 778  The
Court ruled that
[g]iven the difficulties of the times in which the Reich is
struggling for its existence, in which it is a matter of to be or
not to be, the full force of the law cannot be stayed, even for
juveniles, when someone ... takes a stand in a dangerous and
insulting manner against his people and the Fuhrer.779
Hubener was guillotined.7 80
In a similar case, a group of students at the University of
Munich, who were members of the self-proclaimed White Rose
resistance group, were sentenced to death by the People's Court for
having drafted and distributed anti-Nazi leaflets and painting walls
with defamatory slogans. 81  The People's Court noted that a
failure to punish these defendants with death would be the first
step towards the defeat and destruction of the Third Reich.7 82
In a second trial, the students' intellectual mentor, Professor
Kurt Huber, also was sentenced to death.783 Huber declared in
his closing statement that the suppression of morally justified
criticism constituted a breach of the social contract and prophesized
that his protest would be vindicated in the pages of history.M
The Court condemned Huber's lack of patriotism and ruled that he
777. See supra notes 675-90, 720-42 and accompanying texts.
778. Verdict of the People's Court, reprinted in WHEN TRUTH WAS TREASON
GERMAN YOUTH AGAINST HITLER 219, 230 (Blair R. Holmes & Alan F. Keele,
trans., eds., 1995).
779. Id.
780. Id. at 241 (Letter of First Public Prosecutor Ranke, Oct. 27, 1942).
781. See Indictment of Hans and Sophie Scholl and Christoph Probst as Drawn
up by the Reich Attorney General to the People's Court, Feb. 21, 1943, in INGE
SCHOLL, THE WHITE ROSE 105 (1970).
782. See Transcript of the Sentence of Hans and Sophie Scholl and Christoph
Probst, Feb. 22, 1943, in SCHOLL supra note 781, at 114, 117.
783. Id. at 64-65
784. Id.
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had forfeited his membership in the National Socialist commun-
ity.785 The judgment admonished that "[t]he days when every
man can be allowed to profess his own political 'beliefs' are past.
For us there is but one standard: the National Socialist one.
Against this we measure each man!" '786
Professor Ulrich Klug, in reviewing the record, accuses the
National Socialist legal system of having been an accomplice to
murder.787 He points to the transfer of prisoners to the Gestapo
and to the failure to prosecute the crimes of National Socialists.788
Klug, in support of his contention, cites the opinion of the Court at
Buchen concerning the murder of an eighty-one year old Jewess,
Susanna Stern, by a local leader of the National Socialist Party.789
Stern reportedly refused the defendant's order to get dressed
and, in retribution, was shot three times and killed.79° The police
report indicated that the defendant was a "'decent and industri-
ous"' individual with a "'good reputation in the community and
lived a proper lifestyle."'791  The deceased, in contrast, was
described as "'obnoxious and notoriously insolent"' and it was
"'completely believable'' that she had .'resisted ... with typical
Jewish impudence.' 7 92  The Court, after reviewing the record,
suspended the prosecution.7 93
SS-Untersturmfuhrer Max Taubner, in another example of the
judicial legitimation of murder, was prosecuted before the Supreme
Police Court in Munich, in May 1943, for ordering and participating
in the brutal execution of 191 Jews.79 The Court declined to
punish Taubner, explaining that the Jews had to be "exterminated"
785. See Transcript of the Sentence of Alexander Schmorell, Kurt Huber,
Wilhelm Graf, and Others Associated with the Resistance of the White Rose,
Pursuant to the Trial Held on Apr. 19, 1943, in SCHOLL, supra note 781, at 119,
126-27.
786. Id. at 127.
787. Ulrich Klug, Permission for Murder: The Justice System and the Persecution
of the Jews, in THE GERMAN PUBLIC AND PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS, 1933-1945,
59, 65-66 (Jorg Wollenberg ed., 1989) (Rado Pribic trans. & ed., Eng. ed., 1996).
788. Id.
789. Id.
790. Id. at 65.
791. Id. at 67.
792. Klug, in THE GERMAN PUBLIC AND PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS, 1933-
1945, supra note 787, at 59, 65-66.
793. Id.
794. Verdict against SS-Untersturmfuhrer Max Taubner, 24 May 1943, in "THE
GOOD OLD DAYS" THE HOLOCAUST AS SEEN BY ITS PERPETRATORS AND
BYSTANDERS 196, 201 (Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen & Voker Riess eds., 1988).
426 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:2
and that "none of the Jews that were killed is any great loss.
795
Taubner also was found to have acted out of an admirable "true
hatred" for the Jews rather than sadism.796 The Court, however,
was less forgiving of the fact that the accused had taken photo-
graphs of the incident which might undermine the fighting spirit of
the German people.797 Taubner was sentenced to ten years in
prison and was pardoned after serving a little over a year.798 The
charges against those who followed Taubner's order to kill were
dismissed.799 This included SS-Unterscharfuhrer Walter Muller
who allegedly had snatched young children from their mothers and
shot them at point-blank range.
811
Klug concludes that the condonation of murder was a central
component of National Socialism. He writes that the "justice
system under Hitler became an accomplice by not persecuting these
murders and therefore permitting them. ""
B. The Legal Profession and the Rationalization of Evil
The most startling fact, in retrospect, is that jurists continued
their involvement in the Nazi legal system despite their knowledge
of the Reich's depredations. Defendant Josef Altstoetter, for
instance, was Chief of the Civil Law and Procedure Division in the
Ministry of Justice and remained a member of the Security Police
throughout Hitler's rule."°2 The Justice Tribunal queried how
Altstoetter could have maintained his membership in light of his
knowledge of the deportation and extermination of Jews and the
confiscation and destruction of their property.8 3  The Court
concluded that Alstoetter willingly lent his name as a "soldier and
a jurist of note" to the Security Police in return for the power and
prestige of office.8"4  In this process, he knowingly helped to
795. Id.
796. Id. at 203.
797. Id. at 202.
798. See The Pardon, in "THE GOOD OLD DAYS" THE HOLOCAUST AS SEEN
BY ITS PERPETRATORS AND BYSTANDERS, supra note 794, at 207.
799. Dismissal of the Case Against the Remaining Parties I June 1943, in "THE
GOOD OLD DAYS" THE HOLOCAUST AS SEEN BY ITS PERPETRATORS AND
BYSTANDERS, supra note 794, at 206.
800. Id.
801. Klug, in THE GERMAN PUBLIC AND PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS, 1933-
1945 "No ONE PARTICIPATED, NO ONE KNEW," supra note 787, at 67.
802. Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 1170,
1177.
803. Id. at
804. Id. at
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"cloak the shameful deeds of that organization from the eyes of the
German people.
8 15
Only a single judge resisted carrying out his duties. Dr. Lothar
Kreyssig, of the Court of Guardianship, in the town of Branden-
burg on the Havel River, initially engaged in modest acts of
insubordination.8" He refused to attend a judicial ceremony in
which a bust of Hitler was unveiled, °7 protested the removal of
politically suspect judges8s8 and distributed leaflets for the Confes-
sional Church.8 9  A formal investigation was initiated into
Kreyssing's suitability for office and he was reassigned, at his own
request, to the Petty Court in Brandenburg.810 Kreyssing subse-
quently wrote the President of the Prussian Supreme Court
protesting the removal and killing of mental patients."' He then
enjoined several hospitals from transferring wards of his Court and
filed criminal charges against the local Nazi leader responsible for
the euthanasia program. 2 Kreyssig refused to withdraw these
legal motions and was required to retire.813 His acts of resistance
contrast with the conformity exhibited by the remainder of the
judiciary, which was responsible for sentencing between 30,000 and
80,000 individuals to death. 4
The defendants in the Justice trial pled that as lawyers and
judges that they were obligated to obey the dictates of the law,
regardless of their own views. Most, like defendant Von Ammon,
nevertheless insisted that they had applied the law in a fair and
equitable fashion. 15  Defendant Guenther Nebelung, Chief
Justice of the Fourth Senate of the People's Court, proclaimed that
"I was a German judge. I followed the laws of my country and my
knowledge and my conscience in passing judgment .... Does not
every soldier find himself in the same situation?" ' 6  Rudolf
Oeschey testified that he was convinced that "I was doing right, by
805. Id.
806. MULLER, supra note 1, at 194-97.
807. Id.
808. Id.
809. Id.
810. Id.
811. MULLER, supra note 1, at 194-97.
812. Id.
813. Id.
814. Id.
815. See Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Von Ammon, in JUSTICE
CASE Docs., supra note 65, at 816.
816. Final Statements of the Defendants, in JUSTICE CASE DOeS., supra note
65, at 950.
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obeying the law to which I was subjected .... it was a matter of
conscience for me not to misuse the law in a criminal way, but to
apply it in accordance with the will of the legislator, and to grant
the offender a proper trial and a just verdict., 817 The defendants
conceded, as did Rothaug, that they had favored the limitation of
Jewish influence,818 but none claimed to have been aware of the
Final Solution.819
The defendants, like Von Ammon, rationalized that the
determination whether regulations, such as the Night and Fog
program, were consistent with international law was the responsibil-
ity of the executive branch. 20 They reasoned that harsh regula-
tions often were required in order to maintain order at home and
abroad and were preferable to the draconian alternatives which
would have been implemented absent judicial involvement.82 I
Franz Schlegelberger claimed that resistance would have
resulted in retribution and only would have encouraged additional
opposition from those who wished to abrogate judicial indepen-
dence and the rule of law. 822 He calculated that the best course
was to avoid "a larger evil by applying a smaller evil.,
823
Schlegelberger, for instance, contended that resisting the transfer
of prisoners to the Security Police would have been a "useless
sacrifice" which would have resulted in the purging of the Ministry
of Justice and the appointment of officials eager to subordinate
legal principle to politics.
8 24
Defendant Josef Altsoetter was typical of the tendency of the
defendants to rationalize that they had succeeded in moderating the
excesses of the Nazi regime. He noted that "German judges, even
in hard times ... did their duty for right and justice up to the very
end. All that could be desired was that the courage which was
shown among the German judiciary ... would have been shown
everywhere., 825  Prosecutor Ernst Lautz claimed that he had
817. Id. at 952.
818. See Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Rothaug, in JUSTICE CASE
DOCS., supra note 65, at 752.
819. See Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Rothaug, in JUSTICE CASE
Docs., supra note 65, at 391, 402.
820. Extracts from the Testimony of Defendant Von Ammon, in JUSTICE CASE
DoCs., supra note 65, at 834.
821. Id. at 833.
822. See Schlegelberger I, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note 65, at 289.
823. Schlegelberger II, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 722.
824. Schlegelberger III, in JUSTICE CASE DOCS., supra note 65, at 351.
825. Final Statements of the Defendants, in JUSTICE CASE DoCs., supra note
65, at 953.
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tempered his prosecutorial role with wisdom and human under-
standing and that "none of the charges made against me here I feel
to be more unjust than that, by filing malicious indictments, I had
done injustice for the sake of injustice., 826
The actions of these highly educated and accomplished
defendants cannot solely be attributed to their embrace of National
Socialism. Most received their legal training and socialization
under the Monarchy or Weimar Republic and claimed to have been
only titular members of the Nazi Party.8 27  Ingo Muller also
disputes that the pervasive legal positivism propagated in German
jurisprudence explains the legal profession's adherence to National
Socialist ideology.828 He argues that the removal of one-fifth the
legal profession-most of whom were Jews, Socialists and Social
Democrats-left a corps of conservative and frustrated young
lawyers who were inclined to elevate loyalty to the State over fealty
to fundamental legal values.8 29
Professor David A. J. Richards concurs that the conduct of
German lawyers was not solely due to their embrace of legal
positivism.83° He attributes the profession's cooperation with
Hitler to a widespread moral corruption in German society which
associated "freedom with the state, moral action with the radical
sacrifice and denial of the self, and idealism with the pursuit of
heroic excellence and contempt for equality. 83 1  This commit-
ment to an authoritarian and elitist political system ruled by a
dominant and epic personality, in the end, overwhelmed the
826. Id. at 945.
827. Schlegelberger's lack of early involvement with the National Socialist Party
was typical. See Opinion and Judgment, in JUSTICE CASE Docs., supra note 65,
at 1181-82.
828. MULLER, supra note 1, at 296-97.
829. Id. German law Professor Arthur Kaufmann also dismisses the shibboleth
that the perversion of the German legal process was a consequence of legal
positivism. He notes that Nazi lawyers adhered to a "two-track" strategy in which
laws promulgated prior to the Third Reich were applied in a broad and open
fashion while laws promulgated during the Hitlerite regime were strictly
interpreted. Kaufmann, supra note 385, at 1645. For the lingering legal legacy of
the Third Reich, see generally Mathias Reimann, National Socialist Jurisprudence
and Academic Continuity: A Comment On Professor Kaufmann's Article, 9
CARDOZO L. REV. 1651 (1988). H. W. Koch attributes the complicity of German
jurists with the Third Reich to their infatuation with legal positivism. KOCH, supra
note 1, at 246-47.
830. David A. J. Richards, Terror and the Law, 5 HUMAN RTS. Q. 171, 171-72
(1983).
831. Id.
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demands of constitutional democracy.83 2  The root of such a
perversion of principle, according to Richards, was a radical
separation of professional station and personal conscience-a belief
that personal morality must not intrude upon service to the
State.33
In Vichy France, the French legal profession mechanically
applied a complex corpus of laws which were inspired by a vision
of the Jew as lying outside the Christian community.834 Lawyers
were involved in litigating questions such as the definition of a Jew
and the confiscation of Jewish property.835 They devoted little
effort to creatively crafting, challenging and interpreting anti-
semitic statutes.836  This technical fetishism enabled French
lawyers to avoid confronting the larger philosophical issues of
"racial persecution, arbitrary incarceration and mass pillage of
property., 837  Advocates also accepted the exclusion of their
Jewish colleagues from legal practice with seeming equanimity.
838
Professor Richard H. Weisberg notes that the legal profession
in Vichy France narrowly defined the scope of their professional
responsibility and blinded themselves to the fact they were
functioning in a legal culture which had abandoned the fundamen-
tal precepts of French legal traditions.8 39 He further notes that
lawyers expressed few qualms about practicing before judges and
administrative agencies which they "increasingly had reason to
know were culpable of not only pillage but far worse. '
Lawyers under the Third Reich, like their French brethren,
cloaked themselves in the mantle of legal obligation in order to
avoid confronting their individual and collective responsibility.
They portrayed themselves as mere ciphers who were compelled to
obey legal commands. Lawyers, by focusing on narrow technical
832. Id. at 183. Richards identifies five features of the lawless Reich legal
system: abrogation of the separation of powers; abandonment of the principle of
legality and utilization of techniques such as rule by analogy; secret laws;
application of the laws in an unexpected and inconsistent fashion; and the vesting
of judicial power in the secret police. Id. at 180.
833. Id. at 185.
834. See RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN
FRANCE 411-13 (1996).
835. Id. 411-16.
836. Id. at 160, 416.
837. Id. at 195.
838. Id. at 296. The Belgium legal profession was distinguished by their opposi-
tion to the exclusion of Jewish lawyers. Id.
839. WEISBERG, supra note 834, at 335.
840. Id.
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issues, avoided confronting larger philosophical concerns and
considerations. Lawyers and judges often portrayed minor cases as
involving exaggerated social and political costs and consequences
in order to justify the imposition of harsh punishments. Those who
experienced qualms of conscience were able to rationalize that they
were mitigating and moderating the excesses of Nazism."
In sum, the involvement of lawyers and judges in the Third
Reich is not solely explained by jurists' embrace of legal positivism.
Lawyers, like others, were infected by a deep moral decay which
eroded the core concepts of the liberal legal culture. The Eight-
eenth Century values of individual equality, dignity and checks and
balances were sacrificed in favor of a racial and totalitarian ideal.
Legal methodology was reduced to a harsh utilitarianism; the only
relevant criteria in evaluating a legal rule or statute was whether it
advanced the cause of National Socialism. 2
Rothaug and Oschey were Nazi zealots who twisted and
transformed the law into an instrument of extermination." Von
Ammon, Lautz and Klemm were more malleable. They mechani-
cally followed orders while experiencing few qualms concerning the
content of these commands.' 4 Schlegelberger and Rothenberger
expressed doubts, but ultimately seemed indifferent to the
contemptible consequences of their actions. 5  The defendants
acted freely and voluntarily and the regime rarely was compelled
to resort to threat or force in order to obtain the defendants'
cooperation. The depth of the defendants' commitment to the
Reich is suggested by the fact that none expressed remorse or guilt
over the hundreds of thousands whom they collectively extermin-
ated and scarred in the name of justice. They suffered from a
perverse pathology which led them to abandon the primary
principles of continental legal culture and to embrace the core
components of National Socialist ideology. This ultimately resulted
in their complicity in murder.'
841. The seminal discussion of the resort to legal formalism to avoid moral
issues is ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). For a discussion of the response of individual members
of the legal profession to National Socialism, see Vagts, supra note 197, at 678-86.
842. See supra notes 830-40 and accompanying text.
843. See supra notes 699-746 and accompanying text.
844. See supra notes 747-74 and accompanying text.
845. See supra notes 603-28 and accompanying text.
846. See supra notes 815-27 and accompanying text.
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XII. Conclusion
The legal literature generally has failed to examine the role of
jurists in the Third Reich and other repressive regimes. The
Holocaust was not simply an exercise in arbitrary and anomic
terror. The implementation of Nazi policies, to a significant degree,
was the product of legal decrees and judicial deliberations and
decisions."s 7
Hitler viewed law and lawyers with contempt and advocated
a return to an unadulterated Aryan legal system based on blood,
race and soil." He used the Reichstag fire to promote panic and
to justify the centralization of plenary power in the office of
Chancellor.849 Germany's continental criminal justice system was
radically revised and replaced by a Nazi criminal code and court
system which was devoted to controlling and curbing political
dissent and to eliminating racially and socially repellent parts of the
population.85 ° The training, admission and conduct of judges851
and lawyers was subjected to close scrutiny and supervision.852
The enforcement of newly-adopted draconian criminal statutes853
was centered in a streamlined court system which relied upon
expedited procedures.854 This was supplemented by the utiliza-
tion of extra-legal mechanisms of punishment.855 An even harsh-
er version of the Nazi justice system was implanted in Poland and
in other occupied territories.856
Various German lawyers and judges were convicted of war
crimes and crimes against humanity before a post-war American
tribunal. The decision made it clear that lawyers and judges may
not obtain legal immunity by draping themselves in the cloak of
domestic law and are internationally liable for the arbitrary and
discriminatory interpretation and enforcement of draconian
statutory standards. The Justice case stands as the single interna-
847. See supra notes 1-3 and 775-801 and accompanying text.
848. See supra notes 29-58 and 222-24 and accompanying text.
849. See supra notes 64-91 and accompanying text.
850. See supra notes 246-320 and accompanying text.
851. See supra notes 93-176 and accompanying text.
852. See supra notes 183-244 and accompanying text.
853. See supra notes 382-447 and accompanying text.
854. See supra notes 246-304 and accompanying text.
855. See supra notes 359-81 and accompanying text.
856. See supra notes 321-49 and accompanying text.
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tional prosecution of jurists for the commission of transnational
crimes. 8
57
This discussion suggests three larger issues. First, discussions
of human rights must more closely consider the domestic and
international conditions which encourage and undermine the rule
of law. How does a democratic legal system degenerate into
totalitarianism? What are the requisites for the rule of law?
Second, the conduct of German lawyers exemplifies the troubling
tendency among legal professionals to reify and reverently apply
the law with little attention to ethical and moral issues. This is a
disturbing development for a profession which purports to serve as
the guardian of justice and freedom. Third, discussions of legal
ethics tend to focus on the peccadillos of daily practice. There are
few efforts to address the general obligation of lawyers to insure
the rule of law at home and abroad. This remains a particularly
relevant task in the newly emerging global society.858
857. See supra notes 449-527 and accompanying text.
858. See generally DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE AND ETHICAL
STUDY 104-147 (1988).

